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MEA Encyclopedia of India-China Cultural Contacts

India-China relations have expanded significantly in both scope and intensity over the past decade. Both sides have attached great importance to cooperation on a wide range of issues with people-to-people exchanges forming an
important aspect of our bilateral relations. The two sides recognize the importance of expanding such contacts, thereby contributing towards enhanced mutual understanding. With this shared understanding, during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India
in December 2010, the leaders of India and China agreed on a project involving compilation of an Encyclopedia of India-China Cultural Contacts.

images/in_8.jpgThe cover page of Encyclopedia of India-China Cultural ContactsThe work
of compilation of the Encyclopedia was undertaken by a Joint Compilation Committee comprising of officials and scholars from both India and China. The Indian side of the Joint Compilation Committee comprised of Prof. Sabaree Mitra of Jawaharlal Nehru University,
Prof. Madhavi Thampi of Delhi University, Prof. Kamal Sheel of Benaras Hindu University and Prof. Arttatrana Nayak, formerly of Visva Bharati University. The Encyclopedia was released in both English and Chinese versions simultaneously by the Hon’ble Vice
Presidents of India and China on June 30, 2014 in Beijing. The Encyclopedia features over 700 entries, encapsulating the rich history of contacts and exchanges between the two countries in the trade, economic, literary, cultural and philosophical spheres.
While the contents of both the Chinese and English versions are the same, the Chinese version was released in a single volume, while the English version is in two volumes.

images/in_10.jpgVice President Shri Hamid Ansari launches the Encyclopedia of India-China Cultural Contacts
in Beijing (June 30, 2014)

India and China have a shared history of over two thousand years. Being a seminal contribution to the literature on the cultural contacts between India and China, the publication of the Encyclopedia will not only bring this history into the public domain, making
it easily accessible to people of both the countries, but also provide a much-needed boost to the effort to build popular consciousness of and confidence in our shared cultural experience. It is our expectation that the Encyclopedia will be a dynamic document
that is updated periodically as greater research and studies are undertaken on the civilizational interface between India and China.

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?23519/Encyclopedia+of+IndiaChina+Cultural+Contacts

MEA Simla Agreement July 2, 1972

The Simla Agreement signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan on 2nd July 1972 was much more than a peace treaty seeking to reverse the consequences of the 1971 war (i.e. to bring about withdrawals of troops and
an exchange of PoWs). It was a comprehensive blue print for good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan. Under the Simla Agreement both countries undertook to abjure conflict and confrontation which had marred relations in the past, and to work towards
the establishment of durable peace, friendship and cooperation.

The Simla Agreement contains a set of guiding principles, mutually agreed to by India and Pakistan, which both sides would adhere to while managing relations with each other. These emphasize: respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-interference
in each other’s internal affairs; respect for each others unity, political independence; sovereign equality; and abjuring hostile propaganda. The following principles of the Agreement are, however, particularly noteworthy:

  • A mutual commitment to the peaceful resolution of all issues through direct bilateral approaches.
  • To build the foundations of a cooperative relationship with special focus on people to people contacts.
  • To uphold the inviolability of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, which is a most important CBM between India and Pakistan, and a key to durable peace.

India has faithfully observed the Simla Agreement in the conduct of its relations with Pakistan.


Agreement on Bilateral Relations Between The Government of India and The Government of Pakistan

  • The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the
    establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing talk of advancing the welfare of their peoples.

    In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:-

    • That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries;
    • That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries,
      neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations;
    • That the pre-requisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful co-existence, respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s
      internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit;
    • That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means;
    • That they shall always respect each other’s national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality;
    • That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.
  • Both Governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations between them.
  • In order progressively to restore and normalize relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that;
    • Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land including border posts, and air links including overflights.
    • Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country.
    • Trade and co-operation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible.
    • Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted.

    In this connection delegations from the two countires will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details.

  • In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the Governments agree that:
    • Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border.
    • In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of
      mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this Line.
    • The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this Agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof.
  • This Agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into force with effect from the date on which the Instruments of Ratification are exchanged.
  • Both Governments agree that their respective Heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment
    of durable peace and normalization of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.

(Indira Gandhi)
Prime Minister
Republic of India

(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)
Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Simla, the 2nd July, 1972

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19005/Simla+Agreement+July+2+1972

MEA Clarifications on LoC

Delineation of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir
resulting from the Cease fire on 17 December 1971 in accordance with the Simla Agreement of 02 July 1972


  • The representatives of the Chiefs of Army Staff of India and Pakistan held a series of meetings alternately at Suchetgarh, on the Indian side and Wagah Check Post, on the Pakistan side, to delineate the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir resulting from
    the cease fire of 17 December 1971 in accordance with Paragraph 4 (ii) of the Simla Agreement signed between the Govt of India and the Govt of Pakistan on 02 July 1972.
  • A copy of the relevant extracts of Simla Agreement is at Appendix A attached.

    Schedule of Various Meetings

  • The delineation of the Line of Control was effected during nine meetings as follows:-
    Dates Venue
    (a) First Meeting 10-12 August 1972 Suchetgarh
    (b) Second Meeting 21-22 August 1972 Wagah
    (c) Third Meeting 28-29 August 1972 Suchetgarh
    (d) Fourth Meeting 03-15 Sept. 1972 Wagah
    (e) Fifth Meeting 18 Sept. – 01 Oct. 1972 Suchetgarh
    (f) Sixth Meeting 07-08 October 1972 Wagah
    (g) Seventh Meeting 14-22 October 1972 Suchetgarh
    (h) Eighth Meeting 07-09 November 1972 Wagah
    (i) Ninth and Final Meeting 11 December 1972 Suchetgarh

    Composition of Indian and Pakistani Delegations

  • The composition of the two delegations were as under:-
    Indian Delegation Pakistan Delegation
    Lt Gen PS Bhagat, PVSM, VC Lt Gen Abdul Hameed Khan, S Pk, SQA
    Maj Gen MR Rajwade, VSM, MC Brig SM Abbasi
    Maj Gen IS Gill, PVSM, MC Col Mahmud Shaukat
    Col CM Sahni Col Syed Refaqat, TQA
    Lt Col MS Chahal, VSM Lt Col MM Afzal Khan
    Lt Col BM Tewari Lt Col Ahmad Saeed

    Methodology of Delineation

  • The Line of Control was reproduced on two sets of maps prepared by each side, each set consisting of 27 map sheets formed into 19 mosaics. Each individual mosaic of all four sets of maps with the Line of Control marked on them has been signed by the representatives
    of the Chiefs of Army Staff of India and Pakistan and each side has exchanged one set of signed mosaics as required under the joint statement by the representative of Govt of India and Pakistan signed at Delhi on 29 August 1972.
  • A copy of the document is being displayed for perusal.

    Evidence to disprove Pakistan’s contention that the Line of Control is not delineated

  • Jointly Attested Mosaics of the Line of Control: Mosaics of the Line of Control duly signed by Lt Gen Abdul Hameed Khan, S Pk, SQA of the Pakistan Army and Lt Gen PS Bhagat, PVSM, VC of the Indian Army are held by both sides. The original copies of the
    Mosaics are displayed and a miniaturised copy of one such Mosaic is attached as Appendix B for perusal.
  • Delineation of the Line of Control on a Pakistani Map: A Pakistan Map, Scale 1,50,000. Sheet No. 43 N/15, First Edition published under the direction of Major General Anis Ali Syed St(M), afwc, B.Sc (C.E) HONS, M.Sc. M.A.S.C.E., F.I.E., Surveyor General
    of Pakistan, with the Line of Control duly printed, recovered from one of the recaptured positions is displayed. 9. Satellite Imagery/Air Photographs: A Satellite Imagery of the area of instant operations, taken during October 1998, reveals that there was
    no military activity in the area also on intrusion. The Satellite Imagery is being displayed. Air Photographs of the area also highlight the Regular Posts on both sides of the Line of Control, thus substantiating the fact that the troops on ground were aware
    of the alignment of Line of Control. Relevant Air Photographs are being displayed for perusal. Pakistan in the last 27 years, has never disputed the delineation jointly ratified by the two representatives of the Chiefs of Army Staff of India and Pakistan.
    As such, this is a deliberate attempt to mislead and cover up the armed intrusion across the Line of Control by Pakistan Army.

Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir A Part of Simla Agreement

It is a bit surprising to read in newspapers that some people in Pakistan have expressed a doubt that the Line of Control in Kashmir is vague. These statements indicate complete innocence about the meticulous care and thoroughness with which this Line was discussed,
surveyed where necessary, identified on ground and delineated on maps giving detailed grid references and description of land marks. These were checked and re-checked before representatives of the two countries signed the documents pertaining to this Line
and which were thereafter approved both Governments of India and Pakistan. It is necessary to describe the whole process for those who are not aware of how this crucial matter was handled.

The Simla Agreement stipulated that in Jammu & Kashmir, the Line of Control separating the two Armies on the day of cease-fire will be delineated. India and Pakistan very carefully selected senior military commanders to shoulder this historic responsibility.
On the Indian side the team captain was the well known, highly respected, gallant soldier scholar, Lt Gen PS Bhagat, PVSM, Victoria Cross and on Pakistan side the highly respected veteran and a man of sterling character Lt Gen Hameed Khan, S Pk, SQA. It was
a fortunate coincidence that Bhagat and Hameed knew each other since their days in the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun. Consequently they worked on the difficult, time consuming and laborious mission with trust, utter frankness and mutual regard and respect.
General Bhagat’s team included the then Director Military Operations, Maj Gen IS Gill, PVSM, MC. known in the Indian Army as a man of 24-carat-gold for his sterling qualities. Similarly, on the Pakistani side was the then Director Military Operations, Brig
SM Abbasi, scion of the princely family of Bahawalpur. Included in the teams were also Deputy Directors of Survey of India and Pakistan with adequate number of trained survey personnel and survey equipment. The senior military commanders of the two sides were
assisted by three sector commanders along the entire length of 740 Km of Line of Control which was divided in three segments namely the Southern Sector, the Central Sector and the Northern Sector. In turn, sector commanders were assisted by sub sector commanders
to do the ground work on the entire Line of Control. For Example, in the Northern Sector were included the four Sub Sector Commanders of Partapur Sub Sector, Kargil Sub Sector (including Batalik), Shingo (Kaksar) Sub Sector and Drass Sub Sector which are the
areas of current conflict. Sector and Sub Sector commanders of the two countries worked in close co-operation.

A total of nine meetings were held beween the senior military commanders of the two countries and their teams between 10 Aug 72 and 11 Dec 72, alternatively at Suchetgarh near Jammu, and Wagah near Amritsar. At each meeting the inputs of sub sectors were
discussed, the sticky poins resolved and where necessary, a joint survey was ordered to ensure that nothing was left vague or uncertain. It is pertinent to add that there were some issues which had to be resolved by the Army Chiefs of India and Pakistan and
for these both the meetings were held at Lahore in Nov and Dec 72 between Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw and General Tikka Khan. All issues were amicably resolved.

In the whole exercise two sets of maps each comprising of 27 maps were prepared. These marked maps were joined and 19 mosaics were prepared, thus clearly delineating the entire stretch of Line of Control running through 740 Km starting from Sangam and ending
at Pt NJ-9842. Besides the maps, there were 19 Annexures consisting of 40 pages, giving the details of every feature, landmark and coordinates of the Line of Control. The delineated Line of Control was jointly prepared and signed by two senior military commanders,
Lt Gen PS Bhagat and Lt Gen Hameed Khan. These documents were jointly signed and exchanged by the two senior military commanders on 11 Dec 72 at Suchetgarh.

Immediately after signing of the delineation maps and documents at the final meeting of senior military commanders on 11 Dec 72, the DMO flew to New Delhi and reported to the COAS alongwith copies of the signed delineation proceedings and one copy of the
signed maps at 1500 hours 11 Dec 72. The COAS presented these at a meeting of the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet at 16 hours the same day. At 1620 hours a message was received from Mr Aziz Ahmed, Special Assistant to the President of Pakistan for
Mr PN Haksar, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, informing him that the Government of Pakistan had accorded its approval to the Joint Recommenations submitted by the senior military commanders of Pakistan and India on that day in regard to delineation
of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. This message was passed to the COAS at Parliament House and at 1747 hours the DMO informed the DMO Pakistan Army on the telephone that the Government of India had accorded its approval to the Joint Recommendations
in regard to the delineation proceedings.

At 0700 hours on 17 Dec 72 the mutually agreed statement was released in New Delhi and Islamabad. At 2100 hours on 20 Dec 72, a joint statement by the Indian and Pakistan Governments was released to the media regarding withdrawal of troops to the International
Border and delineation in conformity with the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir.

In view of the facts explained above, there should be absolutely no reason for any reservation in anyone’s mind in India or Pakistan that there is anything vague or uncertain about the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. It is pertinent to add that for
a period of over 27 years, the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir has stood the test of time. There have been frequent clashes as well as exchange of fire which were invariably discussed and resolved in flag meetings of the two sides. The authenticity of
the Line of Control was never questioned. It is worthwhile adding that each flag meeting invariably developed into a competition in hospitality!

It is also appropriate to take a close look on the wording of Paragraph dealing with the sanctity of the Line of Control of the Simla Agreement which reads as under:-

“In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace. Both the Governments agree that: In Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from cease fire on 17th December, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised
position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides undertake to refrain from threat of use of force in violation of this Line.”

[The Writer Lt Gen (Dr) ML Chibber, was Deputy Director of Military Operations after 1971 War and later C-in-C Northern Command when Pakistan was prevented from occupying Soltero Ridge and Siachen Glacier]

Extract of Simla Agreement pertaining to Line of Control

4. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the Governments agree that:

(i) Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border.

(ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting form the cease-fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of
mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.

(iii) The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof.

5. This agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into force with effect from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

6. Both Governments agree that their respective heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment
of durable peace and normalisation of relations including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.

Prime Minister Republic of India

President Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Simla, the 22nd of July, 1972

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19004/Clarifications+on+LoC

MEA Joint Statement September 1998

Joint Statement

The Foreign Secretary of India, Shri K. Raghunath, and the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Mr. Shamshad Ahmad, met in New York on 23 rd September, 1998.

Pursuant to the agreement set out in para 4 of the Joint Statement issued at Islamabad on 23 June, 1997, the Foreign Secretaries agreed as follows:

(i) The mechanism to address all the outstanding issues listed in para 4 (i) of the Joint Statement would now be made operational.

(ii) As stipulated in para 4 (ii) of the Joint Statement, all the issues shall be addressed substantively and specifically through the agreed mechanism in an integrated manner.

(iii) All outstanding issues shall be dealt with at the levels indicated below:

  • Peace and Security including CBMs At the level of Foreign Secretaries
  • Jammu and Kashmir Foreign Scretaries
  • Siachen Defence Secretaries
  • Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Secretaries, Water & Power Project
  • Sir Creek Additional Secretary (Defence)/Surveyors General
  • Terrorism and Drug Trafficking Home/Interior Secretaries
  • Economic and Commercial Cooperation Commerce Secretaries
  • Promotion of friendly exchanges Secretaries, Culture in various fields

(iv) The detailed composition of the official teams is left to the discreation of each side.

The above mentioned subjects of this composite dialogue process will be discussed at the indicated levels in separate meetings. The dates of these meetings will be determined by mutual consent. At each round, the Foreign Secretaries will hold separate meetings

  • Peace and Security including CBMs and
  • Jammu and Kashmir and review the progress of the dialogue process.

The Foreign Secretaries will commence the substantive dialogue with separate meetings on

  • Peace and Security including CBMs and
  • Jammu and Kashmir in Islamabad on 15-18 October, 1998. The remaining six subjects i.e.
  • Siachen,
  • Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project,
  • Sir Creek,
  • Terrorism and Drug Trafficking,
  • Economic and Commercial Cooperation, and
  • Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields, shall be taken up in substantive and separate meetings in New Delhi in the first half of November 1998.

The cycle of meetings of the Foreign Secretaries will be continued on this pattern on agreed dates.

New York
September 23 , 1998

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20157/Joint+Statement+September+1998


By Neerja Tiku
Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, Vol.1, No.1 (Jan-March 1997)

‘who has not heard of the vale of Cashmere,
With its roses the brightest that earth ever gave,
Its temples, and grottos, and fountains as clear,
As the love-lighted eyes that hang over their wave.’

— Lalla Rookh by Thomas Moore


Visitors to the valley have vividly described the splendour of the habitat along the Jhelum waterfront. The development along the river presents the most characteristic and memorable urban form of the city of Srinagar. One of the earliest descriptions of the
valley was given by the Buddhist pilgrim from China, Huein Tsiang who visited the valley in 631 A.D. Francois Bernier, the French traveller who visited the valley much later in 1665 A.D. described the valley as ‘the paradise of the Indies’- which fired the
imaginations of the western world, and gave Kashmir the aura that it has retained to this day. Bernier described the city as “not less than 3/4 of a league in length and 1/2 league in breadth…during this time there were only two bridges over the Jhelum”.
Describing the houses in the city he adds, that, although for the most part the houses were built of wood, the houses were well built and consisted of two or three stories. Wood was preferred by most people of the city because of its cheapness and the facility
with which it was brought down from the mountains by man through so many small rivers..

In November 1714, Father Desideri arrived in Srinagar, and found the city and its surroundings peaceful and pretty. He described it saying, “a big river flows through the middle of the city, and nearby are large and beautiful lakes, whereon with much pleasure
and amusement one can sail in small boats or in well formed larger vessels. A great many delightful gardens near or on the border of these lakes form as it were a garland around the city, which contains splendid buildings and well laid out streets, squares
and bridges. The houses of the merchants and of common people, and also of some of the noble are built of stone and brick, but outside they are of deligently carved timber….The whole district round the city is not only beautiful but extremely fertile….”

Kalhana, the Kashmiri poet, traced the history of Kashmir back to four thousand years from 1148 A.D., the date at which he was writing, into the mists of time, through the pages of his great chronicle-the Rajatarangini, (River of Kings). Kalhana, according
to Kennan, “emerges as an exceptionally likeable and wise man, indeed a sort of Kashmiri version of Chaucer and Shakespeare, who clearly loved his country and described it charmingly. Leaning, lofty houses, saffron, icy water and grapes; things that even in
heaven are difficult to find are common here”. Kashmir has been the cradle of ancient culture and a nursery of two great religions-Hinduism and Buddhism. This can be seen in the remnants of its temples and viharas along the riverfront. Islam came to the valley
in the middle of the fourteenth century with the coming of the Sultans.

The city of Srinagar has evolved over a period of more than two thousand years, with a number of settlements being founded, during various periods on or near the site of the present city. Due to their locations at a point which commands the trade routes
to the rest of India and to Central Asia, these settlements served as the capital of Kashmir, as distribution centres for the valley and were also renowned centres of learning. According to Kalhana, ancient Kashmir has had a number of capitals. The most of
these ancient cities was Srinagari, which was founded by Ashoka in 250 B.C. Srinagari occupied the site of present village of Pandrethan, about mile and half east of the Hari Parbat hill. Pandrethan derived its name from the Sanskrit word Puranadhisthana,
literally the old capital. No traces are left of the many Buddhist shrines that by Kalhana’s account once graced the city. Srinagari remained the capital of Kashmir till about the middle of the sixth century A.D. when a new city was founded by Pravarasena
near Hari Parbat hill. This was called Pravarpura after its founder’s name and extended only along the right bank of the river Jhelum (Vitsata). The two cities were in close proximity to each other, and strangely enough the old name of Srinagari triumphed
over the new. Hieun Tsang mentions the two capitals of Kashmir, the old and the new. He also mentions that the old city lay to the south east, at a distance of two miles and to the south of the great mountain. The latter Hindu rulers are reported to have transferred
the capital from one place to another.

The river Jhelum played a very important role in the formation and development of the city. It has been seen that the city developed at a number of sites but the importance of the river – the sustainer of life – has never been lost. All ancient civilizations
evolved along the waterfronts and as such Srinagar is no exception.

The city has evolved in total consonance with the river. A network of canals extended through the city structure inwards from the river’s edge and further habitation spread upto the base of Hari Parbat. Later extensions spread to the edge of the Dal Lake
and the base of Shankaracharya hill and beyond. Thus the growth of the river Jhelum waterfront was the development of the city of Srinagar, which extended about three miles on each side of the river.

Jhelum-spiritual and cultural importance

The Hydaspes of the ancient, the Vitasta of the Hindus and Vyeth of the Kashmiris, has been of great religious and cultural significance to the people of this great Himalayan region. Vyeth – Vatru – a spring below Verinag is believed to be the source of this
great Kashmir river. The Rigveda mentions the seven great rivers of which Vitasta is one. All spiritual and cultural activities of the Kashmiri people revolved around it. The day began with a dip in its holy water, followed by prayers and daily offerings which
were a common ritual. The river was a source of peace and solace and brought harmony among all religions. The mosques built on sites which had been earlier occupied by the temples and viharas were a|so located along it. The spiritual significance of the river
is manifested in the verses [314] of the Nilamata Purana, an ancient Sanskrit text which deals with the sacred places, rituals and ceremonies of Kashmir – in which the great sage Kashyapa says:

forLrk[;k lfjn~:ik nsfo Roa ioZrkRetsA

rifLouh ijk ‘kokZPNoZ iRU;fl uks unh AA 314AA

rifLouh ijk ‘kokZPNoZ iRU;fl uks unh AA 314AA

‘Assuming the form of a river called Vitasta, O goddess, the
daughter of the mountains, you are not a river (but) an ascetic
lady, wife of Sarva, even higher than Sarva.’(Sarva or Lord Shiva)

We even find the significance of the river as an important Teerth Sthana in the Bhringeesh Samhita (Topography of Ancient Kashmir) in which Odes to the various Teerth Sthanas are written. The Vitasta Mahatmaya or Odes to the Vitasta in the 42nd shloka mentions:

forLrk;k egku|k x³Âk leHkoÙkr%A

rn/k’p x.kk nsfo rL; rhFkZfjj{k;k AA 42AA

It clearly glorifies the Vitasta as being as sacred as the Ganges and endorses its significance as an important Teerth Sthana. The river is the lifeline of the people and the pivot around which all life evolved. Today the river is in danger and the settlement
along the waterfront is in a dilapidated state. It is high time that efforts are made to restore the waterfront to its pristine glory.

The evolution of the existing spatial structure

The city of Srinagar has an architectural character and a settlement pattern that is quite distinct from other settlements in the Himalayan region. The architecture and the pattern that emerged was primarily due to the following factors:

(a) The climate

(b) The waterbody – the river Jhelum that formed the main spine of the settlement.

(c) The two hillocks-Gopadri and Shankracharya.

It was also the locally available building materials and the skill and craftsmanship of its indigenous people, that brought about a unique stylistic coherence in the architecture along the waterfront. It may be said that the growth of the Jhelum waterfront
is the development of the city of Srinagar.

The first urban settlement in this area is believed to have been founded in 250 B.C. by the Mauryan King Ashoka and was known as Srinagari. The evolution of the city of Srinagar can be divided into nine phases. In the past the valley of Kashmir is believed
to have been under water with settlements concentrated on higher ground of fertile areas. The two hillocks Gopadri and Shankracharya projecting out. The first settlement is believed to have been at the foothills of the Hari Parbat. This settlement gradually
grew southwards along the right bank of the river Jhelum, with the formation of the Dal lake on the east side. The river Jhelum flowed in a serpentlike manner and was to become the main spine along which the city grew southwards on the right bank. The city
developed on the left bank in the mid-fourteenth century, and the first bridge Zaina Kadal was also built about the same time. The physical remains of the earlier settlements are few. Only some important physical features, large places of worship and monuments,
certain mohalla names, the street patterns and some items and sites can be identified as dating from the earlier period.

However, elements from the Mughal period onwards are identifiable and they have played an important role in the later development of the city.

Spatial Structure and the Urban Form

The spatial structure of the city has evolved in consonance with the waterbodies and the topography. The main movement spine is formed by the river and parallel streets on both banks, connected across by a series of ten bridges, seven of these are of traditional
wooden structures while other three are made of reinforced concrete built in the later half of this century. There is a significant difference in the spatial plan of the old settlement extending from the first bridge down river and the newer development extending
up river towards Zero Bridge. In the traditional pattern, the river’s edge is defined by the buildings standing on retaining walls rising out of the water, and the street which is parallel to the river runs behind the buildings, with narrow crosslanes perpendicular
to the river, and descending in a series of steps to the level of the water.

The new development upriver on the other hand reverses the traditional pattern and has a running parallel to the river which is on a raised embankment along the river’s edge. The traditional pattern evolved with the river being the main transport corridor with
the streets being subservient to it. The streets widened as they extended into the interior with the major street running parallel to the river behind the buildings. The change in the newer development came about due to the importance attributed to the automobile
traffic over the water transport together with the influence of European planning principles. The pattern of the earlier period, in contrast to the latter, presents a richly woven urban fabric at the human scale.

The pattern has a slight bend at the base of the hillock as it stretches southwards in a linear fashion guided by the river. Along its route the river spills into canals which flow into the inland creating settlements alongside it. A very interesting clustering
takes place along the waterfront. In the earlier settlements upstream riverborne traffic alights at a wide flight of steps, commonly known as the ghats, which are regularly spaced along the banks. The steps rise up to the narrow lanes which are perpendicular
to the river, giving access to the houses through private open courtyards, and gardens. These crosslanes meet up with parallel streets which have shops lining both sides and which distribute the traffic by vehicular modes to the rest of the city. The ghats
on the river’s edge are major common open spaces where the daily activities take place such as bathing, washing and activities associated with the temples, mosques and houses located along the waterfront. Each community or individual identifies with a particular
ghat which they patronized and there is hardly any ghat that is left unused. The mohalla along the waterfront was accessible from the ghat by a wide flight of steps leading on to the residential area. There appears to be a large open space between the river’s
edge and the houses which was rather rare, as we move along the waterfront. The shikaras (small boats) are parked along the ghat being used for ferrying people across or to other points along the river’s edge. The trees formed an important element in the cityscape.

Saraf Kadal-an ancient bridge on the Mar canal

The Mar canal formed an interesting waterway meandering through the city. Wherever the back waters of the Dal lake flowed through the city, it was known as the Mar canal deriving its name from the beautiful Marsar. The major portion of the water of the Dal
lake came from the Marsar lake situated beyond the Harwan water reservoir. There was a network of Mar canals flowing through the city. An interesting clustering existed along the canals, some of the houses belonged to the rich merchants, as can be deciphered
from the scale and magnificance of the buildings along the waterway. The canal has since been filled up to form a road. An interesting feature here is the row of shops along the bridge which formed an interesting walking experience across the canal. The shops
appear to project out along the length of the bridge, as can be seen, with the help of timber columns resting on the banks on both sides. At Sekhi dafar there was an interesting streetscape. It was probably an important street within the cluster along the
waterway. There was a row of shops on the ground floor of the houses along the street. The houses overlooked the waterway on one side and the street on the

of the houses along the street. The houses overlooked the waterway on one side and the street on the other.

Nakshband Sahib shrine on way to Hari Parbat

It is a simple and beautiful structure built primarily of timber. It was probably the prototype adopted for the other shrines/mosques seen along the waterfront. The roof structure and the towerlike pinnacle can be seen in a more elaborate form in the Shah Hamdan
mosque along the waterfront. The roofs were constructed of wooden planks laid over with birch bark and made watertight by a layer of specially prepared earth. On these grew white lilies and red tulips presenting a colourful roofscape which was a viewer’s delight
in spring time.

The typical cluster

A study of a typical cluster along the waterfront clearly indicates that the waterfront was dotted with temples and shrines at close proximity to one another and the residential mohallas extended beyond into the mainland. There was a linear extension of the
city along the waterfront and the temples too were within walking distance along the ghat, from the farthest point in the mohalla. The aristocracy and the wealthy traders built their mansions over looking the river for a number of reasons – the primary being
the proximity to the main artery of communication, and the temples located along the river’s edge. The larger houses were built next to the places of worship, and the rest of the associated community came up in smaller and denser clusters, in the remaining
space between the river’s edge and the parallel movement spine. The traders and merchants combined both commercial and residential activities by building along the river’s edge. These larger houses were emphasized by the smaller scale development which surrounded
them. A harmonious relationship existed between the height and scale of the public and religious structures, the larger houses and the smaller residential structures.

View of the Raghunath Mandir and the associated mohalla

The Raghunath mandir was a prominent landmark and had a well defined structure as compared to the other temples along the waterfront. Its towering shikhara stood well above the other structures in the mohalla.

One notices the taller and larger houses located in close proximity to the temple while the smaller ones are in the interior or further down. These houses belonged to the richer merchants and were located on the edge of the river. The entrance to the temple
from the riverside was through the ghat, which had structure above it, forming a gateway to the temple, this was a rare phenomena, not noticed in the other temples. The house on the right hand side, had a private access to the waterfront by a flight of steps
linked to the house through the projected covered balcony. The projected baywindows formed the predominant architectural feature of the facades along the waterfront. The long timber brackets that supported these projections lent a continuity to the composition.
One also notices the courtyard on the extreme right which punctuated the continuous facade, as well as, the grass grown roof tops. The dharamashala on the left side had a temple alongside and the chanting of religious hymns by people seated along the projected
balcony, could be heard by devotees, to the temple across the river.

Old Haba Kadal bridge

(The framing pattern of the wooden bridges can be clearly comprehended. The large houses along the waterfront can be seen, the houses appear to have elaborate projected facades, the towering shikhara of the temple of Somyar is seen at a distance.)

The typical dwellings along the waterfront

The dwellings along the waterfront were approached through the narrow crosslanes which were in turn approached from a wide flight of steps rising from the river’s edge. The buildings were generally three to four storeys high, with basements contained within
the retaining walls along the river side. The houses both large and small followed a similar pattern of organisation. The plans were generally squarish so that a minimum of external walls were exposed and heat was conserved in the cold winter. The rooms were
multifunctional, the rooms on the ground floor serving more public uses while the rooms on the upper floors being more private. The ground floor was approached through a courtyard, by a short flight of steps and was entered through a lobby called wuz, on either
side of the lobby were then located public rooms generally used for multipurpose functions such as meeting with visitors. In some houses the kitchen was located in the rear of the house to the left hand corner and the room adjacent was used for serving meals,
which was generally served on chokies or low wooden tables, the size being such that one large thali or plate could be served on it. The height of the choki was such that a person could have his meals sitting crosslegged on the floor.

The Kashmiri people are generally a very social group and have had a slow pace of life which could be attributed to the harsh climatic conditions and indulgence in intellectual pusuits. They interacted frequently bringing about a closeknit community with a
sense of neighbourliness, and as such there were frequent visitors to the house. The visitors would use the room on the ground floor which was generally large and used by both men and women. In the smaller houses the staircase was located to one side.

The ground floor was used for dining and sitting, besides the kitchen being located in the rear corner, while the large sitting room for visitors was on the upper floor. The room on the ground floor adjacent to the kitchen was known as the wuth, meaning
wrap. It probably meant that due to smaller openings and the warmth around due to kitchen fire, it kept the warmth wrapped around the persons using the room. The first floor had more private rooms used by the family. The second floor was known as the kani,
and was a large room spread to cover the entire floor with windows running all along its perimeter. The windows had typical panels, and were only partially glazed. The low extent of glazing was to keep out the cold in winter and reduce the heat loss in winter.
The kani was used extensively in summer, the windows were generally kept open and the cool summer breeze allowed to blow through. Besides the timber mullions, windows, and timber infills which presented a stylistic coherence, the most striking feature of the
kani were the projected bay windows known as the dub. It was used by the family to overlook on to the riverfront or the street or to be a part of the activities along the major activity zones. The dub was generally located on the southern side so that the
sun was available in winter. These bay windows were cantilevered from the main face and suspended over the river or street. They were constructed by a direct and simple technique of extending over the floor joists and enclosing the three or five sided alcove
with windows all around. These alcoves formed the window seats in the kani and other rooms in the house besides enriching the facades with the bold projections. These window seats were approximately 4 to 6 inches above the floor level and the “sills” were
a foot and a half above the seat level thereby allowing a clear view once seated alongside it.

The layout of the houses along the waterfront were simple and generally depicted a uniform pattern. Inspite of the varying sizes of the houses there existed an intricately woven urban fabric which reflected the cohesive and well knit community, each playing
their part. There were the traders, the merchants, the intellectuals, the shop owners, the teachers, the artisans

and others. The plan could be classified into two types. The smaller square having the stair to one side and rooms on the other, while the larger one with a central stairway with rooms on either side. The basement was used for storage of wood and fuel etc.,
for use during the cold winter months, and was generally approached from the stairs adjoining the kitchen and not visible from the main entry. The basement was large and generally occupied the whole floor.

The staircase, in the smaller houses occupied very little space and therefore was close to a spiral. The larger houses usually had a straight flight of steps and in some there were wooden staircases winding round the central space with rooms around them. There
was a tendency to minimize on the space of the staircase, and as such in the smaller houses the staircases were often narrow with risers as high as 10 inches or more. In the larger houses the risers varied between 6 to 8 inches. The staircases were generally
made of timber. The landing in the smaller houses opened up to the main living space separated by a low wooden partition, of the width of a door and of about 2 feet height which could be crossed over easily and which defined the space of the room. In larger
houses too the entry to the room was defined by this low partition, and the rooms usually had doors too.

The need of the partition was probably due to the fact that owing to the cold weather conditions the rooms were generally carpeted wall to wall or had a mat covering. There was seldom any furniture in the rooms, and generally comprised of low seating along
the walls.

The rooms could be classified into the following:

the brand-steps at the entry to the house.

the wuz-the entrance lobby.

the bud kuth-the large room on the ground floor used for meeting with visitors.

the lokut kuth-or small room, it could be on any floor usually a private space.

the kani-the large room on the second floor or attic occupying the whole floor and used for large family gatherings and festivities. Most commonly used in summer as with its band of windows, it provided a cool breeze.

the shran kuth-the bath usually located on the ground floor adjoining the kitchen, the kitchen fire of the chula used to heat the water in the hamam.

the choka-the cooking area or kitchen.

the kuth-the individual rooms were known by the person occupying the room.

the thokur kuth-the prayer room, it was located above the entrance and projected out of the main facade.

The houses along the river’s edge had private ghats which were accessible from a projected terrace with steps on one side. These ghats were used by the merchants for purpose of trade and commerce. The toilets were located outside in a corner of the large courtyard
and along the wall adjoining the lane in order to facilitate the collection of the night soil without entering the courtyard. In the absence of a proper drainage and severage system in the old city the people shifted out to newer areas and thus it lost the
patronage of the people.

The circulation network

The circulation network comprised of the waterway formed by the river Jhelum and the system of navigable canals together with the parallel spine and the crosslanes or galis and kochas. In the past water transport was of great significance and the movement of
a large proportion of goods and peoples took place along the waterways of Srinagar. The river and the canals were thus an integral part of the circulation pattern and played an important part in the development of the city. There was a definite heirarchy in
the circulation pattern. The river formed the primary artery of movement and thereby the highest order in the heirarchy. The main movement corridor running parallel to the river but behind the houses followed next in the heirarchy. The river, canals, and the
parallel spines were thus of greater width. The bridges were also fairly wide and provided a connection with the development on the other side forming the next order in the heirarchy. The perpendicular lanes joining the parallel spines to the river were next
in order. These then grew progressively more winding in the dense residential clusters. A number of very narrow access galis to small group of houses branched off from these roads. The movement was primarily pedestrian, and as such the narrow galis or kochas
as they were known never gave a congested look. The residents of the mohallas could use either the water transport or the road depending upon which was available in close proximity. As the distances travelled were within 3 kms, and within walking distance,
the movement was generally pedestrian.

The activity spaces along the waterfront

The river Jhelum almost serpentlike streches in a linear fashion from the base of the two hillocks. Along its path on either side stretching inland for a distance of 3 kms lies the present city of Srinagar. The development on either side depicted a similar
pattern and evolved over a period when the river was the prime channel of movement. The earlier development had seven bridges across the river linking the two sides and linking the development as one harmonious whole. One never observes the development as
subdivided along the two banks, as the integration of the two sides has evolved in such a way that the bridges form the major activity zones, with the important bazaars located alongside it.

The land use along the waterfront was a mixed one. The predominant land use being residential, interspersed with religious places dotting the waterfront at a distance of 1-1/2 kms. The large residential building were generally used as showrooms and for commercial
activity. The other important land use was public facilities such as schools, government buildings, hospitals etc. The market was located in the inteior along the street parallel to the river but running behind the houses. The activities thereby generated
along the waterfront were primarily related to residential cum religious activity. The schools and other important buildings were located along the river’s edge due to easy accessibility. The waterfront was dotted with ghats and punctuated by gardens hanging
over the edge of the retaining wall.

The ghat within the mohalla was approached by a wide flight of steps, and was used as an entry to the mohalla. It was used by the residents for washing, bathing and formed the community meeting place. The activities on the ghat would begin early in the morning,
it would start by bathing and washing. The women would, at places, have an enclosed bathing area built along the waterfront. This would be followed by a visit to the temple, in close proximity. Each mohalla had its own temple. At times the boats would bring
in fruits and vegetables at the respective ghats for the residents of the mohalla. The ghats would also serve as delivery points for rations. The ghats formed a significant element in the life of the community. They also acted as the transition space between
the public area of the river and the private residences. There were a number of ration shops and dhobi ghats along the river. Ration shops catered mostly to the residents of the houseboats as well as the houses in nearby areas. The cluster was generally deficient
in educational and health facilities, though at places the facilities were available along the waterfront.

The bazaar street

The main street was generally 6 to 7 metres wide and ran parallel to the river behind the buildings. It was known as the puth bazaar or rear market street. The houses along the street had shops on the ground floor while the floors above were used for residential
purposes. There was a dense pattern of built fabric enriched by the mixing of activities and functions. Houses, showrooms, temples, shops and even schools were accommodated within the street. The commercial activity sometimes extended to the upper floor and
to the smaller streets leading to the interior.

The type of shops depended upon the heirarchy of the street. The main street had shops selling textiles, woollens, sophisticated household items, handicrafts, spices, fruits, vegetables and day to day requirments of the residents of the mohalla.

The secondary street was formed by the crosslanes which zig zagged into the interior leading to the ghats. A group of shops could be seen in the interior along the street. The shops catered to the day to day needs of the residents of the cluster. There were
the tailor’s shop, the baker, the milk man, the meatshop, the barber and the general merchant. These shops catered to the needs of the residents within a 5 minutes walk from their houses. The facade along the main street depicted an endless variation reflecting
the heterogenity of its inhabitants, varying from the rich traders to small shop owners. The shops were on either side of the street, and the height of the buildings fronting the street varied between three to four floors. The steet scape offered an endless
variety of visual experiences in the play of facade treatments and the display of skills of the craftsmen best revealed in the delicately carved wooden pinjara shutters. The light that filtered through these and fell on the intricately designed carpet in the
room together with the delicate and colourful patterns of the kangri made a blissful sight. There existed a stylistic coherence in the entire streetscape that brought about an effect of total proportional harmony. The ground floor had an endless row of shops
along the main street while the upper floors depicted a rythmic play of intricately carved lattice shutters, a series of bay windows, carved screens, and steeply sloping roofs with beautifully carved caves. The streets were linear in arrangement and at times
were punctuated by secondary streets leading to the interior, which often lead on to a temple along the waterfront. The temple of Ganpatyar is one such example.

The temple terrace or ghat.

The temples were located along the waterfront each with its own private ghat or terrace. Each cluster had its own temple within a 5 minutes walking distance from the farthest point in the mohalla or cluster. The clusters were sometimes known by the temple they
contained such as Ganpatyar mohalla or Raghunath mandir mohalla etc. The mohallas were also identified by the name of the bridge or kadal in close proximity such as Fateh Kadal mohalla or Ali Kadal mohalla. The temples formed an important landmark in the mohalla
with its towering shikhar visible from a distance, as well as the sounds of the temple bells that ushered in a new day for the residents of the mohalla. The day began by a bath in the river and a visit to the temple. Water was an important requirement during
religious rituals or prayer and as such the temples were conveniently located. The temples were approached through the narrow crosslanes generally 1.5 to 2 meters wide. The entry was through a court or sometimes through a series of courts. There was a main
shrine with its pradakshina path around, located on a terrace at the edge of the river. The shrine was easily identifiable from a distance across the river with its shikhar rising about the sloping roof of the pradakshina path.

Typical houses along waterfront, with temples in close proximity – View from Fateh Kadal

The terrace had a few steps to one side which lead to the land from where there was a wide flight of steps that lead to the ghat along the river. The ghats served as entry points to the mohalla as well as the important land marks, when movement of people
was primarily by river borne traffic. A study of the clusters clearly indicates that the river Jhelum was dotted with temples at close proximity to one another and the residential areas extended beyond into the mainland. The temples were located along the
river’s edge and were within 5 minutes walking distance from the farthest house in the mohalla. Each mohalla had its own temple and the day began by a bath in the river and a visit to the temple. One notices the waterfront being dotted by temples in close

Wide streets led to the mohalla from the ghat, the upper floors projected out towards the streetside presenting an interesting streetscape. The timber trusses that support the roof are visible in the foreground, the framing of the towerlike structure rising
above the roof is also visible.

The residential area or mohalla comprised of large and small houses along the waterfront. The traders and merchants located their houses overlook the river probably for a number of reasons, the primary being the proximity to the river, the main channel of movement.
Thereby combining commercial and residential activities besides maintaining a nearness to the temples or other place of worship. The houses along the edge of the waterfront generally had a simple square plan with a staircase kept to one side, these houses
were used as showrooms, and the family lived in an adjoining house over looking the common court.

The house had a private ghat accessible from the projected terrace overlooking the river. The terrace had steps leading to the river form oneside. These ghats were used by the traders for transacting business. The houses along the river’s edge were punctuated
by colourful gardens hanging over the edge of the retaining wall. These gardens formed an important element in the open space pattern between the buildings. The temples at places were sometimes located on the river’s edge on a level lower than the surrounding
residential development. The temple in such a case was built on a raised stone embankment with steps leading on to it from rear. The structure was simple in its form, having a square plan projecting out uniformly on all sides with the help of closely spaced
wooden brackets. The projected portion formed the pradakshina path around the main shrine and was enclosed with the help of beautifully carved screens. The towering shikhar above the sanctum pierced as it were through the otherwise sloping roof of the temple.
The temple was simplistic in form and was usually identified by the shikhar rising above the surrounding residential development. The temple forms did not reflect the same maturity and elaborate ornamentations and probably the similar development of architectural
styles as was witnessed in other parts of the country during the similar period or for that matter in the valley six hundred years ago. Of the temples along the waterfront the Raghunath mandir stands out as a prominant structure, but due to its location within
the cluster it was visited primarily by the residents of the cluster. On the other hand the Ganapatyar temple was very popular probably due to its location along the main bazaar street and being accessible by both the channels of movement.

The bazaar at the junction of the street and the bridge

The bazaars at the junction of the street and the bridge formed the hub of commercial activity in the development. There were a series of bazaars along the riverfront at the junction of the bridges which formed the hub of commercial activity within the mohallas.
The development being linear the bazaars served the mohallas in proximity to it within a radius of approximately 2 to 3 kms. The bridge formed the centre of the cluster as it were on either side. Thus the city could be linearly sub-divided into series of clusters
with the bridges forming the centre of each, or the pivot around which the community evolved. The clusters were known by the name of the bridge in close proximity to it. The market served the clusters for their day to day needs. The shops were specialised
in nature and included large showrooms, eating places, large textile shops, groceries etc. The bridges were wide

and the movement was generally pedestrian. The river physically divided the settlement into two but the bridges integrated the development so perfectly that this division was never felt and it appeared as one homogenous settlement. This was due to the fact
that the bridges converged so to speak all activity within the neighbourhood.

The tonga was the most widely used mode of travel. People could traverse long distances on foot. The terrain, the climate, and the slow pace of life encouraged people to walk. The farthest distance that one had to travel to work, or to the temple, to the bazaar,
to the school, or to shop was barely 3 kms away. The interesting streetscapes, the changing visual experiences, the play of light and shade and the landmarks punctuating the zig zag of the streets created an exciting experience for the pedestrian.

Thus walking was not a tiring experience but a rich and exhiliarating one. This was in total contrast to the streets stretched for long distances making walking a monotonous experience. The new development was sparsely spaced out while the old was compact.

(There was access to the waterbody by a long flight of steps, and the raised embankment with the street running alongside it. There were probably shops along the street as is seen by the projected overhangs along the ground floor of the houses on the street.
The pinjakari windows, the projected balconies or dubs create the typical visual experience of the architecture of the Jhelum waterfront.)

The shops within the cluster, along a mohalla lane, or at the end of a lane were typical in their facades. The shop opened on to the street and projected out by a couple of feet. It had a raised plinth and was linked to the rest of the house from the rear.
The shopkeeper usually sat crosslegged on the mat covered, mud plastered floor smoking his hookah, while he sold his wares. The mohalla street usually had a row of shops selling the day to day requirements of the residents of the mohalla. The typical tea shop
seen here, was at the end of a street and was the shop at which the tonga wallahs stopped for a hot cup of sheerchai or salted tea along with the freshly baked bread katlam seen stacked on the right hand side.

Impact of terrorism and perspectives in restoration

It is important to re-examine our traditional habitat and understand the rationale behind the mud-plastered walls, the projected baywindows, the earth roofs with its colourful array of spring flowers, the houses along the narrow lanes etc. so that, what we
build today has the ‘spirit and the aesthetics’ of our traditional forms, even though, we may rely on the developed technology base. The waterfront has lost its grandeur and magnificence. The great resource of traditional craftsmanship is now sadly disappearing
quite rapidly. The architectue that had emerged was a response to the climate, the topography and the traditional lifestyles of the Kashmiri people. Our traditions become far more relevant today than they were in the past. The past is unique and overpowering
and it cannot be ignored. The climate for a return to the traditional appears to have set in, as the society is at the crossroads and there is an urge to look back into one’s roots, serching for an identity.

The waterfront is in a state of dilapidation, the buildings have been destroyed and the people had to flee their homes and hearths. The old settlements which preserved the unique tradition and character, lie plundered and deserted. The rebuilding that takes
place is arbitrary and oblivious of the existing urban form and character of which it is a part. Building materials that are alien to the climate and original urban fabric are being used thus eroding the urban scape.

Eventually if this is allowed to continue, the character of the place would be transformed. The traditions and the cultural identity would be lost forever. A once unique urban pattern and traditional architecture would be replaced by brick, concrete and
steel which not only would be climatically unsuitable but aesthetically appalling. This is our architectural heritage and it must be conserved and restored to its original glory. This is an immense task which requires a great deal of sensitivity so that the
new that is built harmonises with the old and the distinct identity is retained.

The following steps would go a long way in realising this :

  • Setting up of an urban commission with statutory powers, which could monitor and overlook all works that are carried out in the heritage zone.
  • A massive clean up drive to rid the land and water of filth and garbage, that has created unhealthy living conditions.
  • Preparation of a spatial plan in the present context when thousands of houses, many of them being along the Jhelum waterfront have been burnt and destroyed.
  • Restoring the houses to their original owners and involving the people in the rebuilding process, besides providing them all financial assistance required.
  • Curbing the use of concrete and all materials that are not energy efficient and climatically unsuitable besides marring the urbanscape.
  • Specifying the facade treatment so that the original character is retained.
  • Evolving an efficient garbage disposal system whereby the garbage is not dumped into the river.
  • Reviving the Jhelum as a prime channel of movement with the buildings along the waterfront restored of their original glory with their ornately carved eaves, projected bay windows or dubs and screens etc.
  • Restore the temples and important shrines along the waterfront so that they act as important landmarks along the landscape.
  • The waterfront has all the potential to be one of the unique architectural development in the region, where the people are strongly rooted to their tradition and still maintain a strong cultural identity.
  • Design the waterfront as an interesting settlement whereby the tourists too could get an insight into the traditional lifestyles of the people.
  • Redevelop the habitat in all respects including paving of lanes, bylanes, drains etc.
  • Establish Training Institutes which could go a long way in reviving the traditional craftsmanship, which was of a very high order such as the art of Khatamband ceiling, the wooden flooring, carving of eaves, paper machie etc.
  • Last but not the least, lay down specific guidelines for all building works within the heritage zone.

These are some of the many sugestions that would help to make the Jhelum waterfront an important waterway complete with landmarks such as temples, mosques, showrooms, merchant houses, tourist facilities, interspersed with gardens, terraces, houseboats, traditional
habitats etc., so that the people of the valley could once again live in peace and harmony, follow their traditional lifestyles, retain their distinct cultural identity and nurture their arts and crafts and thereby restore their uniqueness in the Himalayan

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19002/ARCHITECTURE+OF+THE+JHELUM+WATERFRONTSRINAGAR+IMAGES+AND+IMPRESSIONS++by+NEERJA+TIKU+Himalayan+and+Central+Asian+Studies+Vol1+No1+JanMarch+1997

MEA Lahore Declaration February, 1999

The Lahore Declaration

Joint Statement ||| Memorandum of Understanding

The following is the text of the Lahore Declaration :

The Prime Ministers of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan:

Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of progress and prosperity for their peoples;

Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries, enabling them to devote their energies for a better future;

Recognising that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries;

Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co- existence

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit;

Committed to the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferartion;

Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building measures for improving the security environment;

Recalling their agreement of 23rd September, 1998, that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;

Have agreed that their respective Governments:

  • shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.
  • shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other’s internal affairs.
  • shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.
  • shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention
    of conflict.
  • reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realisation of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality
    of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural development.
  • reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace.
  • shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Signed at Lahore on the 21st day of February 1999.

Atal Behari Vajpayee – Prime Minister of the Republic of India

Muhammad Nawaz Sharif – Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Joint statement

The following is the text of the Joint Statement issued at the end of the Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore:

  • In response to an invitation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Pakistan from 20-21 February, 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service.
  • The Prime Minister of Pakistan received the Indian Prime Minister at the Wagah border on 20th February 1999. A banquet in honour of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation was hosted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Lahore Fort, on the same evening.
    Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Minar-e- Pakistan, Mausoleum of Allama Iqabal, Gurudawara Dera Sahib and Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh. On 21st February, a civic reception was held in honour of the visiting Prime Minister at the Governor’s
  • The two leaders held discussions on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern. They decided that:
    • The two Foreign Ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related issues.
    • The two sides shall undertake consultations on WTO related issues with a view to coordinating their respective positions.
    • The two sides shall determine areas of cooperation in Information Technology, in particular for tackling the problems of Y2K.
    • The two sides will hold consultations with a view to further liberalising the visa and travel regime.
    • The two sides shall appoint a two member committee at ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relating to Civilian detainees and missing POWs.
  • They expressed satisfaction on the commencement of a Bus Service between Lahore and New Delhi, the release of fishermen and civilian detainees and the renewal of contacts in the field of sports.
  • Pursuant to the directive given by the two Prime Ministers, the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21st February 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the
    two countries.
  • The two Prime Ministers signed the Lahore Declaration embodying their shared vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples.
  • Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee extended an invitation to Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, to visit India on mutually convenient dates.
  • Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, thanked Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to him and members of his delegation and for the excellent arrangements made for his visit.


February 21, 1999.

Memorandum of Understanding

The following is the text of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. K. Raghunath, and the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Mr. Shamshad Ahmad, in Lahore on Sunday:

The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan:-

Reaffirming the continued commitment of their respective governments to the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter;

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Shimla Agreement in letter and spirit;

Guided by the agreement between their Prime Ministers of 23rd September 1998 that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential
for this purpose;

Pursuant to the directive given by their respective Prime Ministers in Lahore, to adopt measures for promoting a stable environment of peace, and security between the two countries;

Have on this day, agreed to the following:-

  • The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and coventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.
  • The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.
  • The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidential or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. The two sides further undertake to notify each, other immediately in the event
    of any accidential, unauthorised or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility
    of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two side shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.
  • The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests.
  • The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.
  • The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs.
  • The two sides shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e.g. between the respective Directors- General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrading and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications.
  • The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora.

Where required, the technical details of the above measures will be worked out by experts of the two sides in meetings to be held on mutually agreed dates, before mid 1999, with a view to reaching bilateral agreements.
Done at Lahore on 21st February 1999 in the presence of Prime Minister of India, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.

(K. Raghunath)
Foreign Secretary of the Republic of India

(Shamshad Ahmad)
Foreign Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999

MEA Joint Statement February, 1999

Joint statement

The following is the text of the Joint Statement issued at the end of the Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore:

  • In response to an invitation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Pakistan from 20-21 February, 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service.
  • The Prime Minister of Pakistan received the Indian Prime Minister at the Wagah border on 20th February 1999. A banquet in honour of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation was hosted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Lahore Fort, on the same evening.
    Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Minar-e- Pakistan, Mausoleum of Allama Iqabal, Gurudawara Dera Sahib and Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh. On 21st February, a civic reception was held in honour of the visiting Prime Minister at the Governor’s
  • The two leaders held discussions on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern. They decided that:
    • The two Foreign Ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related issues.
    • The two sides shall undertake consultations on WTO related issues with a view to coordinating their respective positions.
    • The two sides shall determine areas of cooperation in Information Technology, in particular for tackling the problems of Y2K.
    • The two sides will hold consultations with a view to further liberalising the visa and travel regime.
    • The two sides shall appoint a two member committee at ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relating to Civilian detainees and missing POWs.
  • They expressed satisfaction on the commencement of a Bus Service between Lahore and New Delhi, the release of fishermen and civilian detainees and the renewal of contacts in the field of sports.
  • Pursuant to the directive given by the two Prime Ministers, the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21st February 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the
    two countries.
  • The two Prime Ministers signed the Lahore Declaration embodying their shared vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples.
  • Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee extended an invitation to Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, to visit India on mutually convenient dates.
  • Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, thanked Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to him and members of his delegation and for the excellent arrangements made for his visit.


February 21, 1999.

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18996/Joint+Statement+February+1999

MEA Attention Kashmiri Migrants

Nirvachan Sadan, Ashoka Road, New Delhi-110001

Attention Kasmiri Migrants

(i) The general election to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir has been announced by the Election Commission to be held in four phases as under:-

First Phase

All assembly constituencies in the districts of Kupwara, Baramullah, Leh, Kargil and Rajouri


Date of poll :


Second Phase

All assembly constituencies in the districts of Srinigar, Badgam and Jammu



Third Phase

All assembly constituencies in the districts of Pulwama, Anantnag, Kathua and Udhampur.



Four Phase

all assembly constituency in Doda




Electoral rolls of all the 46 assembly constituencies in the Kashmir valley have been kept for inspection in the offices of the following Assistant Electoral Registration Officers, namely, (a) Secretary, Resident Commission, Jammu and Kashmir Government,
Jammu and Kashmir House, 5-Prithiviraj Road, New Delhi, and (b) Assistant Commissioner, Office of the Relief Commissioner, Jammu. Elections for the first phase have already been notified and no applications for additions, corrections and deletions in the rolls
can now be entertained. However, for the Assembly Constituencies in the districts of Srinagar and Badgam going to the polls on the 24th September, 2002, and for the Assembly Constituencies in the districts of Anantnag and Pulwama, going to the polls on 1st
October, 2002, the Kashmiri migrants living in Jammu, Delhi or elsewhere who wish to enroll themselves as electors or get their names corrected or any names deleted from the electoral rolls may apply in the prescribed form (Form 6, 8 and 8B respectively),
so as to reach the abovementioned officers latest by 27th August, 2002, and 4th September, 2002, respectively.


The Election Commission has worked out a scheme to enable the Kashmiri migrant electors, who are residing at various relief camps in Delhi, Jammu, Udhampur and nearby to cast their votes in person at the above general Election, at any one of the following
polling stations:-


1. Govt. Women’s College, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu.


Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Janipur.

3. Directorate of Education, Accountancy Training Institute, Muthi.

4. Chanderbhaga Community Hall, Canal Road.


5. Directorate of Rural development Department & Horticulture Department, Talab Tillo.

6. Govt. Higher Secondary School for Migrants, Nagrota.


Govt. High School, Purkhoo.

8. Govt. High School, Mishriwala.



Office of Secretary, Resident Commission, Jammu and Kashmir House, 5-Prithiviraj Road, New Delhi

10. Office of Additional D.M.(HQ), Tis Hazari.


11. High School, Battal Ballian, Udhampur.

(iv) Those who wish to exercise their franchise in person should intimate details of the electors of their families to the Assistant Returning Officers mentioned below in prescribed Form ‘M’, option once given shall be final.

1. Secretary, Resident Commission, Jammu and Kashmir Government, Jammu and Kashmir House, 5 Prithviraj Road, New Delhi,

2. Assistant Commissioner, office of the Relief Commissioner, Jammu, and


Additional Deputy Commissioner, Udhampur.

(v) All migrant voters (other than those who opt to vote in person) have the option to vote through postal ballot papers. They may apply for the postal ballot paper in the prescribed Form 12C available in the offices of the Assistant returning Officers mentioned


All migrant voters are advised to send their forms (Form 12 C or Form “M”), duly filled in and attested, to the concerned Aassistant Returning Officers so as to reach them on or before 6th September, 2002, for Assembly Constituencies in the districts of
Kupwara and Baramula, 14th September, 2002, for the Assembly Constituencies in the districts of Srinagar and Badgam and 21st September, 2002 for Assembly Constituencies in the districts of Pulwama and Anantnag.

(vii) To facilitate attestation of Forms ‘M’ and 12C, sufficient number of gazetted officers will be available in the offices of the Assistant Returning Officers.

(viii) All migrant electors can post their application forms and, later on, their marked postal ballot papers in the special letter boxes which will also be available at the offices of the Assistant Returning Officers.

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18981/Attention+Kashmiri+Migrants

MEA Kargil and Beyond- Talk by Jaswant Singh (EAM) July 20, 1999

Talk by Sh. Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs at India International Centre on 20th July, 1999

Mr.Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is now time to look ahead; to look beyond Kargil. But even in charting our course for the future we have to assess what Kargil 1999 was all about? What were the challenges – military and diplomatic? What new facets of our total national commitment and endeavour
emerged? What lessons for the years that lie ahead? ‘Operation Vijay’ – as the Prime Minister said some days back – has resulted in ‘Vijay’ for India. As we re-examine the military and diplomatic challenges that then confronted us, and which were successfully
managed, we need to have a preliminary analysis, draw some first conclusions and above all, looking beyond Kargil, draw a route chart for the tomorrows to come.

First, the military dimension. Kargil was a military aggression by Pakistan, with Pak army regulars, across a stretch of the LoC, in four pockets, from the Mushkoh Valley in the west to Tartuk in the Yaldor – Batalik sector in the East. Initially, with the
aggressor – as with all aggressors lay the element of surprise. This was soon countered locally. Initially, the terrain, too, conferred some advantage to the aggressor. They had intruded along ridgelines to occupy some key heights and features that dominated
a vital road link, between Dras and Kargil. The depth of the ridgelines north of the LoC and their gradients, along with nullah approaches enabled the Pakistan army to provide crucial logistical and administrative support to their troops.

The Indian army’s response to the military challenge was measured yet swift, it was focussed, thus effective. The first task was to contain the intrusion. For this an accurate assessment was necessary about the degree and extent of it. This involved, amongst
other activities the drawing of fire. Simultaneously, a redeployment of troops took place. Through a successful containment of the aggressor’s intrusion was ensured the inevitable defeat of this misadventure by Pakistan. The element of surprise was countered
by the Indian army through the speed and lethality of its response. On 26th May, the Air Force swung into action in support of the ground operations.

Our military objective had been clearly spelt out to the intruders – retreat or the Indian army shall evict you. In any event once the intruder’s aim of interfering with the Dras-Kargil Highway had been thwarted the whole rationale of this aggression had got
defeated. A mere holding of heights was militarily a counter productive venture. They were bound to be evicted – in detail – one by one; for their occupation served scant military purpose. For India, occupation of territory, south of the LoC, was simply not
acceptable both physically and as a violation of a principle. Tactical surprise having been lost early by the aggressor, the military principles of superior force, concentration and firepower were bound to tell. And they did, decisively. This phase of eviction
did not, indeed could not be a phase of battles of maneuver. The nature of the terrain, the adversary’s dispositions plus most importantly our self-imposed restraints about the LoC, precluded those options. The battles for the heights thus became classic infantry
actions in high altitude, combining mountaineering and fighting, against fixed enemy positions at a higher elevation. They were actions that demanded grit, stamina and dauntless courage. Our troops displayed all these qualities in full measure.

Let us be clear about one other vital aspect. This aggression in Kargil sector was by the Pak regular army, it had the logistic and administrative support of not the Pakistani Army alone but of their total state machinery. Secondly, this misadventure was
not aimed at infiltrating into the Srinagar Valley, it was to occupy territory in Kargil and in holding that. This purpose, too, was defeated.

The Kargil aggression is not an extension of the problem of externally aided and abetted cross border terrorism that we have combated uptill now. It is an overspill of the ‘Afghanistan’ disorder syndrome’. That is also why it had to be defeated.

In parallel to the military, we also had major diplomatic challenges on our hands. A firm signal had to be conveyed to Pakistan, as also a clear and unambiguous message to the international community. Let us accept that in today’s age no conflict, least of
all one between two nuclear weapons possessing states can escape global media spotlight. This was an additional and a new factor. Managing all these required a qualitatively new level of coordination between the two wings of the South Block – the Ministries
of Defence and External Affairs. This, too was achieved to demonstrable effect.

Of course, Kargil posed a challenge both to the substance of our foreign policy as also to the conduct of our diplomacy. The Prime Minister had at the very beginning directed the MEA that the true challenge lay in turning back the aggressor, in defeating
all his designs, in reversing the aggression but with the maximum of restraint. The MEA had, therefore, also placed before itself the objective of protecting the international flank of the MoD; so that our operations on the ground and in the air could go on
unhindered. This was also achieved in no insignificant measure. The first requirement, thus was establishing the fact of Pakistan’s intrusion and aggression. I would venture to claim that we succeeded in doing so. The next requirement was to spell our objectives
with clarity, consistency and candour. This was done early, repeated whenever necessary and can be summed up, sequentially, as the following irreducible minimums. They were:

A] Pakistan’s armed intrusion in Kargil will be evicted and its aggression vacated. All Pakistan regular troops and extremist elements under its command and control will have to withdraw. For this purpose, our armed forces will take all necessary action on
our side of the Line of Control.

B] Once this intrusion has been cleared, Pakistan would need to reaffirm the inviolability and sanctity of the Line of Control.

C] Dialogue, as part of the Lahore process, which afterall, was initiated by us could only then be resumed.

Our diplomatic machinery was geared fully to convey these objectives to the international community, as being valid and worthy of support. Continuous interaction was maintained, with all the major powers, and the rest of the international community through
our diplomatic missions abroad, the diplomatic community in New Delhi and through personal interaction. It is a measure of the justness of India’s cause that what I have cited above, as the irreducible minimums, found such a large community of countries standing
up in support. Principally, let me repeat, it was because India’s stand was recognised as just, thus it was acted upon. I wish to also emphasize that the importance of the inviolability and sanctity of the Line of Control, for maintaining peace and tranquility,
was totally accepted by the international community, and Pakistan was held as having violated this Line. Its efforts at terming it as imprecise also failed. Even more, the international community accepted India’s view that Pakistan was guilty also of transgressing
the territory of trust. The international community also concurred with our assertion that Kargil was a manifestation of this medieval malevolence spilling over from Afghanistan, that these were no freedom fighters, thus there was a need to confront such impulses;
in the interest not just of our region but of the larger global community.

It is noteworthy that under the leadership of the Prime Minister the Ministries of External Affairs and the Ministry of Defence worked as one, the combined synergy of which demonstrated the true power and effectiveness of the Indian State. This is, of course,
how it should be. But it is a matter of satisfaction nevertheless, that this was achieved at a time of trial, a time which tests the mettle of any Government’s machinery. In this is also a lesson for the future.

There was an added dimension to our total national endeavour. It was the role of our media during Kargil operations. It was marked by exuberant enthusiasm bordering, at times, on the reckless. These young men and women of the media, who were in Kargil brought
the valour of our troops, in the face of great odds, directly into the homes of our citizens. They touched our hearts and eyes with the tales of the bereaved and the families of the fallen. This was our first experience of conflict in the TV/information age.
We learnt as we went along. It would be no exaggeration, therefore, to say that the role of the electronic and the print media, in fully informing and mobilizing public opinion, was an invaluable part of the total national effort to meet the challenge of Kargil.

Why did Pakistan undertake such an ill-conceived misadventure? Perhaps, they thought that they could translate the advantage of tactical surprise into a strategic gain by bringing about a defacto realignment of the LoC, in the region, thus rendering the Srinagar-Leh
National Highway vulnerable. They were wrong. They miscalculated India’s resolve, they did not comprehend the sense of national outrage at this blatant breach of trust, the sheer motivation of the Indian soldiers and the leadership quality of the Indian Army
officers who led from the front. Perhaps, Pakistan calculated on provoking India into an escalation. They were wrong again because the decision of not crossing the LoC was taken early and maintained scrupulously, in the face of high casualities and even when
the decision to employ air power was taken. The area of conflict was not expanded. Pakistan having disowned its troops as “freedom fighters”, could hardly thereafter have opened up a new front, to ease pressure in Kargil.

What of the future? Looking beyond Kargil provides us an opportunity to renew our faith in ourselves, our society, our polity and our nation. It compels us to look ahead in all fields of national endeavour but particularly, in the spheres of national security
and foreign policy. One simple message emanating from Kargil is that adequate resources have to be made available for national defence, that the kind of relegation of defence needs that we witnessed in the late eighties and nineties is unsound policy, that
technological upgradation cannot be postponed, that the nation must always think of the welfare of those who are in the first rank of its defence.

Kargil has many pointers for our foreign policy and diplomacy too. As in the present instance, we should always be ready to engage with the world as full and responsible members of the international community, but, of course, keeping our national priorities
and interests as the guiding principle; we ought to have no reluctance, leave alone fear, in engaging with the world on any issue. Indeed, we serve the national interest when we engage the world on the basis of equality and mutual respect. Such engagement
is the very substance of diplomacy. That is not any internationalization of an issue. Nor does it imply mediation or any acceptance of intermediaries.

Issues have to be addressed bilaterally between concerned countries, and in the case of India and Pakistan, that is what the Lahore process is all about. We would like to renew that process and we would like Pakistan to facilitate a resumption of the process,
by reaffirming the inviolability and sanctity of the Line of Control. Clearly, a sponsorship of terrorism across the Line of Control, or elsewhere, is a violation of the Line of Control, as indeed of Simla Agreement and Lahore Declaration. There is a need,
for Pakistan, to abjure sponsoring, aiding or abetting cross-border terrorism. These are not any pre-conditions for dialogue. We are after all, the initiators of this dialogue process and our commitment to it is firm and abiding. But it is only right for our
nation, at this juncture, to expect that Pakistan will repair the damage that it has done to trust, that it demonstrates this through concrete and tangible steps. Trust is not built by engaging in dialogue in winter and committing aggression in summer. Continuous
calls for Jihad can also hardly be read as messages for dialogue and peace. And it is in this vein that I suggest that high pitched propaganda against India also does not inspire confidence in Pakistan’s interest in dialogue.

I would venture to suggest that Pakistan, too, has to come to terms with its history, as indeed with its geography. It has to realize that there simply is no military solution to what it presumes is its locus-standii in Jammu and Kashmir. It is, of course,
for Pakistan to determine its priorities but fomenting religious fundamentalism can hardly be employed as a tool against want and poverty. India recognizes the permanance of the sovereign state of Pakistan and that is final. While India remains ready for dialogue,
the pace at which it can move forward will depend entirely on when and how the state of Pakistan, and what it has now become, permits it to do so.

Our foreign policy has not been fixated on Pakistan, but that has been a significant preoccupation of it. We need to re-examine this in detail. Globally, India has to move purposefully towards realizing its true dimensions- as a major civilisational state,
with its own strategic autonomy and strategic space, born out of its economic and political interaction with other countries particularly in the Asia-Pacific community. The real wealth of a nation is its people. History and paucity of appropriate resources
prevented us from participating in the economic transformations brought about since the Industrial Revolution. In 1820, Asia contributed 58 per cent of the World GDP; today it is at 37 per cent; by 2020, expectations are that it could regain the level of 200
years ago. India has a signal role to play in the coming decades. With our democratic institutions, a large skilled manpower base, geographic location, we must ensure that India rides the crest of this wave.

Through the travail and fire of Kargil our nation has been renewed. The mood though sombre, is confident. National will stands sharpened. The sacrifice of our youth has not and will not be in vain. That is the solemn message of Kargil to the nation and to the
world. I close with the poignant words of the memorial at Kohima, that stands tall and proud on a hill, commemorating those who fell in another war:

“When you go home

Tell them of us

And say

For your Tomorrow

We gave our Today.”

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18995/Kargil+and+Beyond+Talk+by+Jaswant+Singh+EAM+July+20+1999

MEA Statement issued by the External Affairs and Defence Minister Shri Jaswant Singh at His Press Conference in Agra July 17 2001

Verbatim Record of Press Conference of Shri Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs held at 10 00 hours on 17th July, 2001 in Oberoi Hotel Agra


  • At the invitation of Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the President of Pakistan H.E. General Pervez Musharraf visited India on 14-16 July, 2001.
  • In keeping with his abiding vision of good Neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan, the Prime Minister had invited President General Pervez Musharraf to walk the high road of Peace and reconciliation. Our commitment to that noble objective, upon
    the attainment of which, rests the welfare of many, is not transitory. It is that commitment, which was demonstrated at Simla, in Lahore and recently during President General Pervez Musharraf’s visit.
  • Significant CBMs that were announced prior to President Musharraf’s visit would be fully implemented on our part. It is our conviction that, when put in place, they will make an important contribution to our relations.
  • During his visit, the President of Pakistan had extensive discussions with our entire leadership. These included three rounds of one-on-one meetings with the Prime Minister and an hour-long farewell call prior to his departure yesterday night. There were
    also detailed discussions during delegation level talks. All these meetings were marked by cordiality and candour. They provided an invaluable opportunity to both sides to understand each others’ view points, concerns and compulsions.
  • Our negotiations for an agreed text of a document were seriously pursued. There were long hours of discussions at official and political levels. During these negotiations India did not shy away from any issue. In keeping with the confidentiality, which
    is necessary for these negotiations, and the maintenance of which is essential for the future of bilateral relations themselves, it would not be proper to go into details. However, it needs asserting that during the negotiating process, India fully respected
    all established international norms. As a mature and responsible democracy, we negotiate to improve bilateral relations with our neighbours, not to indulge in public relations.
  • We are of course, disappointed that the two sides could not arrive at an agreed text. It will not be a breach of confidentiality to clarify that this was on an account of the difficulty in reconciling our basic approaches to bilateral relations. India is
    convinced that narrow, segmented or unifocal approaches, will simply not work. Our focus has to remain on the totality of relationship, our endeavour to build trust and confidence, and a mutually beneficial relationship even as we address and move forward
    on all outstanding issues, including Jammu & Kashmir: building upon the existing compacts of Simla and Lahore.
  • It was also made abundantly clear to the Pakistan side during the visit, that the promotion of cross-border terrorism and violence are unacceptable and must cease. Let there be no illusions on this score: India has the will and resolve to defeat all such
  • We will pick up the threads from the visit of the President of Pakistan. We will unceasingly endeavour to realise our vision of a relationship of peace, friendship and cooperation with Pakistan.

MR JASWANT SINGH: As this text, ladies and gentlemen of the press, will be shortly with all of you, I wish to simply add that on these three broad areas, which is, a unifocal approach by Pakistan, which conflicts with the concept that we
abide by, that relationship has to be broad-based or spaced by an approach which was dictated by the impulse that unless the issue of Jammu and Kashmir is made central there will be no progress on any other aspect. We do not believe that bilateral relations
between India and Pakistan ought to, or can be held hostage by any single issue. We believe in the totality of approach which addresses all issues. As we move along improving bilateral relations we will continue to address the issue of Jammu and Kashmir as

The second aspect is relating to cross border terrorism and violence is unacceptable to India. I might refresh your memories, ladies and gentlemen of the press, that even during the Lahore visit on the eve of which we had experienced, if you would remember,
the killing of 22 innocent civilians in Jammu, we had still persisted with our endeavour and Pakistan had then found it possible to announce with India, its complete opposition to terrorism and rejection of it. That was the second difficulty.

The third is that we continue to believe that every compact, or agreement, or effort that has preceded the present effort cannot be negated, rescinded, or wished away. That is why we made it clear and there is a reference here that the effort at Agra was a
continuation not simply of the Lahore process but also as a building upon the foundations that were laid by Shimla. It is that central objective which again had some difficulty in being accepted by our distinguished visitors. These were the three broad areas.

I am, of course, in my colleague Joint Secretary (Publicity)’s hands and I will endeavour to answer all questions that you might have, subject of course to the confidentiality that must always mark discussions between Heads of Government and Heads of State,
and subject also to the fact that I actually work in Delhi and not in Agra and I must go back and start working. I have an aeroplane to catch which is really an aeroplane that has to take back high dignitaries and I do not want to keep them waiting. So, as
Nirupama has said, we have an hour and a quarter. I am in your hands Nirupama, and she is in your hands. I do not mean physically.

QUESTION (MS PAMELA CONSTABLE, WASHINGTON POST): What is the likelihood that Prime Minister Vajpayee will still accept the invitation from General Musharraf to visit Pakistan, and how would you characterise the atmosphere and the tone of the
talks as they ended last night, compared to the cordial atmosphere in which they began on Saturday?

MR JASWANT SINGH: There is an invitation that has been extended to Prime Minister Vajpayee. He has accepted that invitation. That invitation and its acceptance remains in place. So far as the atmosphere of departure is concerned, naturally
it was marked by some disappointment on both sides. But in the totality of India-Pak relations, I am not disheartened by any one single incident to take that as the defining incident and treat that as a kind of fixed mark for ever.

QUESTION (MR RAMESH BHAN, UNI): Was President Musharraf stopped from addressing a press conference yesterday?

MR JASWANT SINGH: I must correct this because it is a matter of, for me personally, very great regret that my distinguished colleague and officer of the Ministry of External Affairs received very uncivil treatment. I must put it on record, it is my responsibility
that she was so subjected and I really wish I knew that. I am very sorry Nirupama, I want to publicly apologize to you because I am responsible for your welfare as a Minister. It is a matter of very great regret to me.

I must clarify abundantly that as a visiting Head of State, Head of Government, we did not stand in the way of, whenever General Musharraf or anyone else from the Pakistan delegation wished to meet the media, have a press conference in whatever fashion at
whichever place. It is not we that stood in the way of General Pervez Musharraf. Even though the whole thing trod very close to negotiating through press, we did not at any stage choose to do so because that is not how discussions or negotiation between high
dignitaries of State is ever conducted or can ever be conducted. So far as denying an opportunity to His Excellency General Pervez Musharraf sahab to meet the press last night, the question does simply not arise. There was an original intent that should an
agreement or should an agreed text of a document be reached, then of course there will be a joint press conference. As the evening progressed it became evident that this was becoming more difficult to achieve. Thereafter I think, if I am not mistaken, around
9:30 or so at night – I might be in error on the exact time of it but roughly at that time – a request was received that General Musharraf, after the farewell call, would like to meet the press in Hotel JP Palace. The security requirements accompanying General
Pervez Musharraf mandate that 90 minutes’ notice be given for any press conference or any meeting with the press to be held. We were given a departure time and it was simply not practical, as dictated by security, to have an impromptu press conference in Hotel
JP Palace. It was not the Government that stood in the way, it was a security consideration and the practicality of holding a press conference at such short notice which is really the aspect of it.

QUESTION (MR NARAYANAN, ALL INDIA RADIO): How close did you come to an agreement yesterday? There are reports that you almost clinched an agreement but India backed out of it later on.

MR JASWANT SINGH: I am not going to engage in the game of who backed out from what. It is not proper for me to go into that exercise. Complex discussions and negotiations of this nature always hang by a thread as it were. We made every effort
to arrive at an agreed text. I must place on record that I received all cooperation and understanding from my distinguished and able counterpart His Excellency the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. But I do not want to say how close we were or how far we were
because when it comes to issues of principle, it is not possible for India to treat principles as being close, or to compromise with them in any sense.

QUESTION (MR SOUMYA BANDOPADHYAY, PRATIDIN): At yesterday’s breakfast meeting President Musharraf had compared Kashmir with Palestinia. At the same time he had made reference to actions of India in Bangladesh. What do you think about it?

MR JASWANT SINGH: I do not want to comment on the views held and expressed by General Pervez Musharraf sahab at that breakfast meeting. The original request that had come to us was that he would like to meet the senior Editors, – if I understand
right, I do not want to be faulted on detail because I necessarily do not go into all details – that it was off the record meeting and we facilitated such a meeting. The views the he holds are his views. Of course, we do not agree with them.


QUESTION (SEEMA GUHA TIMES OF INDIA): I just wanted to know what happened during the farewell call. What was the mood like of President Musharraf and the Prime Minister?

MR JASWANT SINGH: What happened during the farewell call? I regret very much that it is not up to me to disclose what was discussed between two Heads of Government. What was the mood like? As I have already explained, the mood was reflective.

QUESTION (MR VIJAY NAIK, SAKAL PAPERS): I just want to know that yesterday in the briefing by Pakistani side, they said that some of the Ministers objected to the points which were in the document and, therefore, the document or the declaration
could not be arrive at.

MR JASWANT SINGH: Please repeat that.

QUESTION (MR VIJAY NAIK, SAKAL PAPERS): The Pakistani side after the meeting briefed their own press and said that some of the Ministers did not confer with the points which were there in the document or the declaration and, therefore, the
declaration could not be signed and that they were disappointed. We were also told by her that the Indian Government is also disappointed. Was it a fact that we objected to certain points which we did not agree.

Secondly, I just want to know why Indian Government actually gave these points which were raised by Shri Vajpayee in the first meeting with Mr Musharraf after 24 hours to the press here. They could have been given immediately after he made the points. But why
did we delay? When Mr Musharraf went on addressing the press conference, we received the speech of Mr Vajpayee after 24 hours.

MR JASWANT SINGH: The first part of the question, for those of you that have not heard it, is ‘were there any differences in the Indian delegation, particularly amongst the ministerial colleagues of mine in regard to the text of the document
that was being discussed?’ The second part relates to, ‘why was Prime Minister Vajpayee’s statement in the plenary held back and not issued until almost 24 hours after it was made?’

To the first part about differences, let me set all your minds at rest. At a feverish pitch good friends in the media imagine all kinds of occurrences. Please do not let your fever rise to such levels. There were no differences between the ministerial colleagues
that constituted the delegation. This is a canard which I refute with all emphasis. It is a absurdity. These are my distinguished colleagues in the Cabinet. To suggest that we were working at cross purposes is really to belittle the high purpose which has
inspired all my ministerial colleagues in this task of finding an answer to the complex issue of India-Pak relations.

On the second aspect relating to ‘why was Prime Minister Vajpayee’s opening statement in the plenary held back, it was done for the obvious reason which I have specified. India does not believe that discussions or negotiations between two Heads of Government
are ever or can ever be conducted in public or through the press. We abided by that impeccably. However, when we found that there was a kind of approach from the other side of engaging with the media as an additionality to discussion, to which aspect I have
referred in my opening statement, it was found necessary that for the sake of the public of India the essence of what Prime Minister Vajpayee had emphasised and said be made also known to everybody.


QUESTION (MS ARUSA ALAM, PAKISTAN OBSERVER): You have very forcefully raised the so-called cross border terrorism issue. Not long ago your own Chief of Army Staff and authorities in Jammu and Kashmir have admitted that the LOC has been very
quiet. In the past Indians have been alleging that Pakistani troops fire and under the firing the infiltration takes place. When you have admitted yourself that LOC has been quiet for the last seven months, how can you blame Pakistan for cross border terrorism
at this point? First of all, why did cross border terrorism became the bone of contention in this historic Agra summit?

MR JASWANT SINGH: I must answer both these points. As it happens, I have the honour to be the Defence Minister of India as well. So, I do not have to go simply by what my gallant Chief of Army Staff says. I do know what is happening on the
Line of Control. It is not a question of timing: it is a question of clearly asserting that one of the beneficial consequences of the peace process that was launched by Prime Minister Vajpayee on the 23rd of November last has been relative quiet on the Line
of Control. There is secondly an illusion, or a misapprehension which is in fact tacitly admitted in your question itself that cross border firing across the LoC was engaged in by Pakistan to facilitate infiltration. Infiltration is, of course, facilitated
by that but it continues, notwithstanding the relative quiet that prevails. It is our hope that that achievement will continue.

QUESTION (MR JAYAKRISHNAN SIFY): You have outlined three points which you said are the difficulties between the two sides. General Musharraf had taken up a point where the Union Information and Broadcasting Minister Sushma Swaraj had made
some remarks. He had objected to that. How much of that was a factor, or was that a factor at all?

MR JASWANT SINGH: I must clarify this again. I have heard reports that my good friend and distinguished colleague in the Cabinet, the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Shrimati Sushma Swaraj somehow spoke on her own as it were, and
was not supposed to do so, and all kinds of other assumptions are made about her. She is the Minister of Information and Broadcasting of the Government of India. When she speaks, she speaks with the authority of the Government of India. There is no question
of the Minister of Information and Broadcasting speaking out of turn, for that matter any Minister speaking out of turn, on matters of high policy. As to whether that had an affect on the discussions, negotiations, etc., – not at all because after all what
Sushmaji pointed out were aspects of what is public knowledge and were aspects that were emphasised by the Prime Minister subsequently also.

QUESTION (MS GEETA BAJAJ, EYE ON ASIA, USA): Mr. Minister, despite several wars and decades of hostility, India and Pakistan have been successful in hammering out the Shimla Accord in 1972 and the Lahore Declaration in 1999. At both times
there was a democratic leader in Pakistan. Now, many of us got a flavour of the offensive, straightforward strategy of General Pervez Musharraf on television yesterday. There was also an expectation that because he is a dictator he will be able to deliver
in case he does hammer out an accord with India. To what extent do you believe, Mr. Minister, that the fact that he is a dictator and he is used to getting his way perhaps got in the way or had an influence on the result of the Summit? Could you share your
views with us in terms of one-on-one kind of discussions at the delegation levels, if that aspect came through. I mean, whatever you can share with us.

MR JASWANT SINGH: Thank you very much for your long thesis. It is more a thesis than a question. Please understand that it is not for me to comment on the internal arrangements that Pakistan chooses to have for itself. I am certainly not going
to engage in a theoretical exercise of who is it better to deal with or negotiate with, one or other variety of governance.

QUESTION (MR JAYANT GHOSHAL, BARTAMAN PATRIKA): Do you think that yesterday’s breakfast meeting was a critical point that destroyed the atmosphere of the Summit? Secondly, since you are the Defence Minister also, do you apprehend escalation
of violence again on the border in Jammu and Kashmir? Yesterday also incidents took place.

MR JASWANT SINGH: On this much beaten about question of breakfast press meet, press interview by His Hxcellency General Pervez Musharraf sahab, I have already replied. When we are seized in complex negotiations, the objective being the high
purpose of lasting peace, amity and goodwill between India and Pakistan, then certainly we firstly do not and cannot negotiate and discuss through the media, much as you might, all ladies and gentlemen of the press, like it. Insofar as the other aspect of
incidents on the Line of Control go, I did say that there is relative peace on the LoC. I did not say there is total peace. These incidents happen It is regrettable. We deal with the incidents as they arrive.


QUESTION (MR VINOD SHARMA, HINDUSTAN TIMES): Since last evening we have been hearing from Mrs. Rao’s counterpart on the Pakistani delegation that the draft agreement, the so-called Agra Declaration or whatever, was discussed and agreed between the two Heads
of Delegation and between the two Foreign Ministers and at the eleventh hour it was sabotaged or discarded or whatever by a hidden hand. That is the statement coming from the counterpart of the spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs. What do you have
to say about this? Rashid Qureshi speaks for the President of Pakistan and he has been making these statements. Would you agree that right from the word go, be it in sartorial terms or be it in diplomatic terms, Pervez Musharraf treated this Summit as a media
event to score certain media mileage over India?

MR JASWANT SINGH: In both the aspects, I do not wish to comment on His Excellency General Pervez Musharraf sahab, the President of Pakistan, at all. So far as the official spokesman of the Government of Pakistan is concerned, I am sure you
will understand that it is not for me to engage in rebuttals, contradictions, clarifications or in any kind of bandying of words with the official spokesman. I refuse to engage in that kind of exercise – “The official spokesman said this, what do you have
to say?” The official spokesman will deal with it.

QUESTION (MR SATISH JACOB BBC): Prime Minister Vajpayee had been invited to Pakistan and we were told that he had accepted the invitation? Will he be going to Pakistan, and how soon?

MR JASWANT SINGH: I think that was one of the first questions asked, if I am not mistaken by Pamela Constable and I have already answered it. The invitation was extended by His Excellency, the President of Pakistan. The Prime Minister of India
has accepted that invitation. That fact remains in position. The dates of the visit, the convenience of the visit, etc., is now a matter of diplomatic arrangements and that will be dealt with in due time.

.QUESTION (MR IMTIAZ GUL, THE FRIDAY TIMES, LAHORE): You are calling Pakistan’s insistence on the centrality of Kashmir as a unifocal approach. But, as we understand, India is also pursuing almost the same approach by predominantly emphasising
on the issue of cross-border terrorism. With what expectation did you invite General Musharraf? Did you expect that he would be giving in on this issue as he described that the Indians are not accepting it as a dispute?

MR JASWANT SINGH: I must clarify this. There are two aspects of the question. Just as Pakistan is fixated upon the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, the distinguished questioner has suggested that we are fixated upon cross-border terrorism as
the only issue. No. Let me correct this. It is one fo the issues. It is a very imprtant issue. I had made clear in my prepared text that the two approaches differ here. Pakistan’s approach is that unless the issue of Jammu and Kashmir is addressed nothing
else will happen. India believes that in the totality of relationship between the two countries, all issues should be addressed simultaneously which is what really the composite dialogue process is all about. We believe and we continue to believe that as we
progress in increasing confidence and trust, and movement of people between our two countries, there can and will no doubt be movement in regard to the issue of Jammu and Kashmir as well. There was a second part of the question which was relating to the expectation.
So far as expectations are concerned, yes, certainly the invitation was inspired by the expectations of not the suggestion being that anyone should abandon the fixed positions of principle. Not at all. But the expectation was that there will be accommodation,
understanding and movement forward.

QUESTION (MR CHANDAN MITRA, PIONEER): Jaswantji, the build up to the Summit was not exactly propitious with a series of interviews being given by President Musharraf, which were fairly belligerent in tone. From your response also when you
had to clarify a number of points, it was very clear that both countries were fairly determined to stick to their respective positions on the eve of the Summit. So, looking back at this kind of build up and the fact that both countries were fairly adamant
on these two approaches that you spoke about, do you think the Submmit was held prematurely, and that there was inadequate preparation, and that it would have been better if the preparations had happened at the level of officials and some of these key issues
sorted out before the two leaders actually met?

MR JASWANT SINGH: So far as the first part, Chandan, your suggestion that I was belligerent in …

QUESTION (MR CHANDAN MITRA, PIONEER): I did not say you were belligerent, Mr. Minister.

MR JASWANT SINGH: But then I am glad that you do not think I was belligerent.

As to the press interviews that General Pervez Musharraf sahab chose to give prior to visiting India, surely that is his choice. It is his determination and we do not at all wish to comment on that except to say what I have in my press statement that it
is our belief, that we remain committed to it, that when it comes to discussions on bilateral and international issues, even if it did not involve Heads of Government and Heads of State, even if it involves officials of countries, we shall not negotiate through
the media. That is our commitment. I was very severely commented upon by a number of friends in the media that whereas in Pakistan there was almost two or three media events per day Mr. Vajpayee did not choose to give even one interview, and that I was remaining
silent. I was not remaining silent because I had lost my speech! I was remaining silent because it is not proper for me to keep on engaging in answers to questions that arise, or rebuttals. That is not how diplomacy is conducted. When I chose to speak, it
was only because a great many issues of importantce to India were suffering through default. It was an obligation that I had to the nation and to the Government to make clear certain issues.

As to whether there should have been preparation, we did suggest to Government of Pakistan that firstly let there be an exchange of officials prior to the Summit. We volunteered that we will send the officials of the Ministry of External Affairs to Islamabad
to sit with their counterparts to agree upon an agenda, and to prepare what is ordinarily done before such summits preparatory documents for the summit, so that all the preparatory work which is routine and which is normally done before such meetings is taken
care of. Consistently we received a response from Pakistan that they did not want such a visit to take place, that they did not want officials to visit Islamabad, that so far as the agenda is concerned they did not wish to fix an agenda in advance, that it
be left to the two Heads of Governments to determine the agenda when they meet. As hosts, we could only request our distinguished guests up to a point. We kept on uptill the last day almost, suggesting that it is better if there is preparatory work done and
an agenda is determined. I cannot dictate: I can only request.

QUESTION (MR CHRISTOPHER KRAMER, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD): Good Morning, Mr. Singh. What are we left with in terms of India-Pakistan engagement? There have been a number of suggestions about the kinds of meetings and the levels at which they
might take place. Say, over the next six months, what are the high levels at which do you expect the interaction exactly to be?

MR JASWANT SINGH: Permit me to somewhat alter the suggestion of alarm in your question about what are we left with. It suggests that everything has collapsed in India-Pak relations. No, that is not so. This is an ancient relationship. Pakistan
is our neighbour. I have made clear in the opening statement that I have given that India remains committed to working towards lasting peace, amity and co-operation with Pakistan and this high purpose which has inspired the Prime Minister’s public life will
continue to be our purpose. In practical terms, I have made clear that the invitation to the Prime Minister by His Excellency the President of Pakistan is in position. The invitation has been accepted. Through diplomatic methods a convenient date for such
a visit will take place. No doubt that there will be other opportunities at other levels to continue with interaction between the two countries.


QUESTION (MR SRINIVASAN JAIN, NDTV): During the negotiations, at any stage, at any level, was there an acceptance of the centrality of Kashmir in any sort of peace process between India and Pakistan? Of course, other issues would also have
been a part of that. But was there any acceptance that Kashmir would emerge as the central issue? Secondly, given the sort of serious differences that seemed to have emerged late last night when the talks eventually seemd to break down, what hopes you have?
What could be the basis for any future engagement with Pakistan, at least with this regime?

MR JASWANT SINGH: That Jammu and Kashmir is an issue which needs to be addressed has been recognised by India and so stated since, in fact, the Shimla Agreement. India remains firm on that. If some of you would go back to the text of Shimla
Agreement you would find a reference to that. India’s position has, therefore, remained constant. We recognise that it is an issue. We are committed to addressing the issue. I understand you enquired about the centrality. I have answered that in my prepared
text. Here we have a conceptual difference with Pakistan. We recognise it as an issue that needs to be addressed. We do not recognise it as the only issue. We do not certainly – I have answered this question and I do not wish to bore you with repeating the
same reply – accept it as the core issue and such other definition. But we accept it as an issue and we are committed to addressing it.

QUESTION (MR SRINIVASAN JAIN, NDTV): I had a second part of the question which was, what was really the basis for any future talks given the very serious differences.

MR JASWANT SINGH: Yes, and I have answered it. I have answered this to several other questioners earlier. I would not treat this as the end of the exercise. Our commitment to peace and dialogue, amity between the two countries remains. I have
said this earlier. The caravan of peace will continue on its march. I have no doubt in my mind that on some auspicious day, it will reach its destination.


QUESTION (MR PREM PRAKASH ANI): There was hardly any preparation for this Summit. Now that the invitation for Mr. Vajpayee has been accepted, can one expect that there would be preparation for that?

MR JASWANT SINGH: I followed your question. Please let me correct this because in the question there is a misimpression as if India did not prepare for it. I do not believe that. I have now held this responsibility for several years. I have
no difficulty in sharing with you that the officers of my Ministry have taken to despair as to how many demands are made on them about preparing for this visit! The Government of India or the Ministry of External Affairs or other Ministries were not lacking
in preparation for this visit, were not wanting preparation. We were fully prepared. All the members of the delegation were fully briefed. The documents that we had prepared had not been prepared impromptu. They had been prepared weeks in advance, discussed
at length between the ministerial colleagues and the delegation members. So, the preparation on India’s side was not lacking. All that I am pointing out is that when India suggested that let the officials of the two Governments meet, prepare some basic working
documents and arrive at a possible agenda for submission to the Heads of Government, we found sadly that Pakistan did not want it in that manner.

QUESTION ( RANJAN GUPTA CBS): How will you now characterise India-Pakistan relations after the talks? Are they better than before the talks, or worse? Considering that a tremendous amount of much-displayed bilateralism did not succeed, will
you go in for third party goodwill, third party mediation?

MR JASWANT SINGH: Yes, we have a better understanding of the Government of Pakistan and I would hope that they have a better understanding of the Government of India. Third party – ‘No.’ Two parties are more than adequate. Three is a crowd.

QUESTION (MS ADITI PHADNIS, BUSINESS STANDARD): Mr. Minister, you have acknowledged that there are conceptual differences between India and Pakistan on various issues. If there are conceptual differences, what is the space left for you to take
Indo-Pakistan relations forward?

MR JASWANT SINGH: There are conceptual differences, but I believe that India and Pakistan’s relations should not be defined by differences. They must be able to move beyond and transcend the differences for the sake of the welfare of the peoples
of the two countries.

So far as my responsibility as the Minister of External Affairs of India goes, I do interpret my responsibility as one of constant endeavour to attempt to bridge the gaps of understanding, to continue to endeavour to reconcile differences. That indeed is the
inspired thought that persuades the Prime Minister too.

QUESTION (MR SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN, TIMES OF INDIA): Would you use the word failure to describe the Agra Summit?


QUESTION (MR SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN, TIMES OF INDIA): Once talks have broken down in terms of the text of the declaration, was there any attempt to reach an understanding on a very basic minimum text such as, ‘the President of Pakistan has come,
extended his invitation, the Prime Minister has agreed’ etc., something that would just be a minimum statement which could have been given and which might perhaps have given a better ending to this meeting, if as you said, you do not want to characterise it
as a failure?

MR JASWANT SINGH: No, I do not characterise it as a failure. I do term it as yet another step in our march towards finding lasting peace, amity and co-operation between the two countries. I do not wish to speculate what would have been better
and what would not have been better. That is now in the realm of past.


QUESTION (MR STEPHEN, LONDON TIMES): Sir, you continue to emphasise the totality of relationships and he, one central issue. You look to the precedents of Shimla Accord, and the history, and to the future, and you keep issues confidential
– whereas he talks in public. Can you do business with this man?

MR JASWANT SINGH: Well, I have just done business with him. I have to deal with the world as it is and not as it ought to be.


QUESTION (MR RAJA MOHAN, THE HINDU): Mr. Minister, you said, ‘three is a crowd’. One of the problems at the Summit was Pakistan’s attempt to bring a third party into the definition of the problem whether through the notion of self-determination,
whether through taking into account the wishes of the people. Was that one of the problems that did not allow the final declaration to come?

MR JASWANT SINGH: There are two aspects of your question Raja. If I went into the details of answering the second, I would teeter very close to confidentiality of discussion. Permit me not to indulge in any such fine balancing acts.

So far as the first which relates to ‘three is a crowd’, and was there any attempt to bring the third, no, there was not. India and Pakistan by themselves are enough to deal with India-Pakistan matters.


QUESTION (MR JAIRAM, INDO ASEAN NEWS SERVICE): Mr. Minister, what will be the implication of this Summit on the SAARC process? Is it destined to remain in a limbo for long?

MR JASWANT SINGH: I must make it clear that so far as SAARC is concerned, before the Summit the Foreign Secretary Mrs. Chokila Iyer was due to go in a special meeting of the Foreign Secretaries to intiate the SAARC process all afresh. Most
regrettably, just then the sad and tragic events invaded Nepal which has insisted on postponement of that visit. I have no doubt that the Foreign Secretary has now got fresh dates for the purpose and she would be going and it is my hope that the SAARC Summit,
subject of course to the convenience of the other member-countries and the host country Nepal where the meeting will take place.


QUESTION (MR SMITH, PRESS TRUST OF INDIA): I would like to know whether the talks achieved anything in real terms. Or, were they a futile exercise?

MR JASWANT SINGH: No, it is not a futile exercise. We remain committed. Real terms is your subjective way of putting it. Your real terms and my real terms might differ.

I have an aeroplane to catch which does not wait for me. But I will answer that question.

QUESTION (MS KATHY SOKO, KYOTO JOURNAL): It was not so long ago that M.J. Akbar had written in his book ‘Kashmir Behind the Veil’ quoting former statesman Jaiprakash Narain. He wrote in a confidential letter to Indira Gandhi many years ago
– “We profess democracy but rule by force in Kashmir. We profess secularism but that Hindu nationalism stampede us into trying to establish it by repression. Kashmir has distorted India’s image in the world as nothing has done. The problem exists not because
Pakistan wants to grab Kashmir but because there is deep and widespread political discontent among the people.” Now, I would like to ask you, Sir, in the year 2001, how would you characterise Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir?

MR JASWANT SINGH: First of all, I do not agree with what late Jaiprakash had written. That is his personal viewpoint. When you call Indian rule, please correct yourself. The State of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. Whatever
internal problems that India faces, we are committed to resolving both internal as also the aspect of cross-border terrorism.

Ladies and Gentlemen of the press, I am really in your hands. I have endeavoured as best as I could.


QUESTION: Some of your crucial allies, even elements within your ruling family, are opposed reviving talks with Pakistan. In the wake of this failure, will the Government have some rethinking on this? Will there be a chance for the Prime
Minister to meet the President in New York in the General Assembly Session?

MR JASWANT SINGH: Firstly, this is not a failure. Secondly, your suggestion that there is any difference of opinion within the National Democratic Alliance, No. What you described as the family, not there either. Will he meet the President
on the sideline of the United Nations General Assembly? That will be determined in due time.


Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18994/Statement+issued+by+the+External+Affairs+and+Defence+Minister+Shri+Jaswant+Singh+at+His+Press+Conference+in+Agra+July+17+2001

MEA Summary of Press Briefing by the Official Spokesperson July 18, 2001

In response to questions, the Spokesperson said the following:

Asked about the statement of Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Mr. Abdul Sattar that considerable understanding was reached at the Agra summit, the Spokesperson said that we have seen Foreign Minister Sattar’s statement and comments to the media yesterday on President
General Pervez Musharraf’s visit to India. We are happy that President Musharraf has carried the impression back to Pakistan that there is a great desire within India for the establishment of good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan. The caravan
of peace will move ahead, our engagement with Pakistan will continue. The processes of peace that have been put in place at the initiative of the Prime Minister will also proceed forward. It was disappointing that no closure was reached on the text of an agreement.
We will, therefore, have to begin again on the basis of the existing agreements, i.e. Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration, which are the cornerstones of India Pakistan bilateral relations.

Asked to respond where the Agra summit stands if Pakistan and India have to begin on the basis of existing agreements, the Spokesperson said that the initiative taken by the Prime Minister has been carried forward by this meeting. The processes of peace will
be carried forward.

Asked to comment about the Pakistan Foreign Minister referring to cross -border terrorism as being apart from cross-LoC terrorism, the Spokesperson said that, we are astonished by the technicality that Pakistan has voiced. We know very well that Pakistan
understands perfectly what is meant by cross-border terrorism which is inclusive of encouraging and abetting infiltration of terrorists across the Line of Control.

Asked to comment about the Pakistan’s Foreign Minister statement that one cannot avoid the media in parleying a simultaneous role in contemporary diplomatic negotiations, the Spokesperson said that this is a very novel interpretation on how diplomatic parleys
are to be conducted. While we recognise the need for information access on the part of the media, such information cannot violate the terms of confidentiality; secondly it must not violate the terms of diplomatic propriety either. Thirdly there is a time-tested
code of conduct between the host and the guest in regard to observance and to which applies to both in terms of access being provided to media. This is because if the logic of media conducting negotiations simultaneously with the principals is to be accepted,
then international and bilateral confidential parleys might as well be held in an amphitheater with media present all the time. She added that it is an unwritten convention during one to one talks between Heads of Government, quite often even notetaking is
dispensed with leave alone constant sharing with the media.

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18993/Summary+of+Press+Briefing+by+the+Official+Spokesperson+July+18+2001

MEA PAKISTAN : THE DANGERS OF CONVENTIONAL WISDOM – International Crisis Group Report, Islamabad/ Brussels, March 12, 2002

With the continuing military campaign in Afghanistan, the international community has fundamentally shifted its policies toward Pakistan. The government of President Pervez Musharraf has been repeatedly praised as a key ally in the war against terrorism,
and the U.S. alone has indicated that it will offer Pakistan more than one billion dollars in assistance. This briefing explores some of the most important dynamics underpinning the international community’s revised approach to Pakistan and suggests that much
of the conventional wisdom relies on dangerously faulty assumptions with important implications for future policy and regional security.


Few nations have been more dramatically thrust into the spotlight since 11 September than Pakistan. Prior to that date, Pakistan found itself increasingly isolated as a result of a number of factors including fairly transparent military and security support
for both the Taliban and militant cross border insurgents in Kashmir, a military takeover of government in October 1999 and deep and persistent economic difficulties.

In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the government of General Musharraf was directly pressured to cooperate with the Bush administration on a range of issues including condemning the 11 September attacks and assisting
in the destruction of Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network, ending support for the Taliban, granting blanket overflight and landing rights and access to Pakistani military bases, and offering intelligence assistance and logistical support. Pakistan moved
quickly to assure the United States that it would offer full cooperation, and it was deemed an essential partner in the war on terrorism.

Clearly, Pakistani assistance has greatly facilitated the military campaign in Afghanistan. Given its central role in
Islamabad/ Brussels – March 12, 2002

PAKISTAN : THE DANGERS OF CONVENTIONAL WISDOMhelping bring the Taliban to power, the withdrawal of direct support was bound to have a significant impact. Equally evident, Pakistan’s stability and economic and political prospects will be crucial in
shaping South Asia’s security picture – no small matter in an area with two nuclear powers and several active terrorist networks. Given its importance in the regional equation, however, it is worth subjecting key assumptions of the international community’s
approach to Pakistan to closer scrutiny.

The current high praise for the Musharraf government is driven both by appreciation for measures it has taken and by fears of possible alternatives. Western officials, analysts and

reporters have warned direly of that government’s fragile state and suggested that it could succumb to angry street protests or swelling Islamic extremism. Similarly, much has been made of the influence of extreme Islamic religious parties within Pakistan’s
political system and public life. Others have pointed to potential splits between the country’s military and its Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in trying to explain Pakistan’s long running support for Islamic extremist groups. All these
points are often combined, when viewed against the backdrop of efforts to cooperate with the West since 11 September, to suggest that the Musharraf government has made a fundamental strategic and philosophical shift in recent months.

Unfortunately, many of these claims do not stand up under closer scrutiny. They require glossing over the symbiotic relationship between Pakistan’s military and security services and Islamic extremists in recent years as well as the desire of the country’s
generals to maintain their institution’s central role in political life. Far from being besieged by Islamic extremists, Pakistan’s military government has carefully used that

phenomenon as an essential tool to justify its hold on power, improve its standing with the West, and resist restoring secular democracy and as a tactical means to advance its goals in both Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Unless the international community more clearly recognises this, it will likely cede the current military government far too much latitude in delaying, or denying, long overdue moves to restore democratic governance and create a disturbing impression among
the citizens of Pakistan that the West actually favours authoritarian governments over freely elected ones. Giving the Musharraf government carte blanche will only likely drive the country further into its long spiral of corruption and economic malaise. Ultimately,
instability in Pakistan would lead to intensified regional instability and help create an environment in which terrorism could flourish.


“Top officials are adamant that the government’s decision to side with the U.S. is a moral stand against terrorism. But they also say President Pervez Musharraf must be rewarded for his gamble — or risk losing public support to the angry mullahs calling
for a jihad against America.”

USA Today
5 October 2002

One of the first pieces of conventional wisdom regarding Pakistan to take a direct hit during the last several months was the notion that an angry “Pakistani street” was waiting to rise up against the military government if it cooperated with the West. As events
unfolded, street protests were relatively few, not well attended and short lived. However, the military government was able to use the threat of such unrest to help leverage wider benefits for its cooperation, and President Musharraf was able to portray himself
as a bold leader taking a stand against religious extremism.

However, the fizzle of street protests should come as no surprise. It has traditionally been Pakistan’s military that has played a lead role in encouraging religious parties to take to the streets when it saw fit for such protests to be held. Far from being
under direct siege by the more extreme religious parties, the military and these parties have enjoyed a long running and symbiotic relationship. It is also important to note that Pakistan’s military, while relying heavily on such elements to achieve certain
goals, remains a largely secular force with little interest in embracing a fundamentalist religious
worldview – making its approach all the more cynical.

The military and intelligence services have used these parties to promote their agenda in several important ways. According to a former chief of ISI, General Hameed Gul, “Religious forces have always aligned themselves with the military’s views with regard
to the defense budget [and] the Kashmir and Afghan policies”.1 1 Mubashir Zaidi, “The loss of strategic depth can be attributed to the unholy shadow of the foreign office—former ISI chief, Hameed Gul”, Herald, December 2001, p. 49. Pakistan’s military leaders
supported the Taliban to attain their goal of strategic depth in Afghanistan by squeezing out the interests of other regional rivals including Iran and India and the forces of the Northern Alliance. The concept of strategic depth was developed in the 1980s
by General Gul and implemented by Army Chief General Aslam Beg. According to the former, the policy of “strategic depth” was originally strongman General Zia-ul-Haq’s, who “had given the ISI the task of running it”.2 2 Ibid. p. 48.

Support for the Taliban and religious parties within Pakistan also let the government take potential steam out of a move for a unified Pashtun territory stretching across the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Religious extremists trained and funded in Afghanistan
by Pakistan were also seen as an important tool by which to “bleed” India in Kashmir through cross border insurgency. The logic was simple: if Pakistan could make the cost of holding Kashmir high enough for India by helping to sponsor a long running guerrilla
campaign, New Delhi would eventually offer a fundamentally favourable deal at the negotiating table.

The military government has also used its support for extremist groups to advance its domestic and international agendas. The military and intelligence services have employed extremist elements as a convenient tool with which to bludgeon mainstream political
parties when they are seen as becoming too powerful or moving in directions contrary to the perceived interests of the military establishment. By pointing to the twin threats of religious extremism and political party corruption, the military establishment
has also been able to justify its self-perpetuating rule to the people of Pakistan. Similarly, when dealing with the international community, the military government has often portrayed itself as the best defender against the same extremist groups that it
has done so much to nurture – an effort somewhat akin to the old tale of the man who murdered his wife and then pleaded for leniency as a widower.

For the extremists military and intelligence backing has helped to carve out a sometimes influential role in a society where there has traditionally been little support for fundamentalism, and extremist parties mostly fare poorly at the polls. Before 11 September,
official support also meant money, guns, transport, intelligence and an aura of immunity from prosecution for these groups and their leaders.

Given such deep links between Pakistan’s military government and these groups it is small surprise that extremist groups did not turn out en masse to bite the hand that feeds them. While the military government’s control over more radical religious parties
is clearly not absolute, these groups would exist even farther on the margins of Pakistani society if it were not for the frequent sustenance they have received from the military government and security services.


“Although Musharraf recently has replaced the ISI leader, there are doubts he has a firm hold on the organisation. This looms as a long term threat to the Pakistani leader.”
The Courier Mail
11 January 2002

Much has been made by international commentators that the ISI is a rogue agency, with an independent agenda, that poses a potential threat to President Musharaff’s hold on power. From such a perspective, the Pakistani military is seen as a more secular force,
with the ISI serving as a hotbed of extremism and fundamentalist Islamic beliefs. Much attention was also given to the fact that on 8 October 2001, Musharraf demoted the head of ISI, Lt. General Mehmood Ahmed. Musharraf insisted this was simply a long planned
staff shake-up but others speculated that Ahmed was demoted because he wished to maintain support for the Taliban. While much has been made of the dismissal, it should be noted that within Pakistan Ahmed has never been considered particularly fundamentalist
in his worldview. As a key coup maker who commanded the crucial Rawalpindi corps, Ahmed did, however, pose a threat to Musharraf himself. Hence Musharraf first removed Ahmed from active command by appointing him Director General of the ISI. After 11 September,
and confident of US support, Musharraf removed him from the Army altogether.

In any case, the ISI’s independence has often been overstated. Pakistan’s military remains deeply disciplined, and the ISI falls directly within its chain of command. Almost all ISI officers are regular military personnel, who are rotated in and out for no
more than three years. Few military officials interviewed in Pakistan would even suggest that ISI would operate out of the direct chain of command that traces back to the Chief of Staff of the Army.

According to Musharraf’s Communications Minister and a former Director-General of ISI, Lt. General Javed Ashraf Qazi, the ISI is composed of elements inducted into the agency for a fixed tenure from all over the armed force and then returned to their units.3
3 The News, “ISI Doesn’t Have Links with Jihadis: Qazi”, 28 February 2002. Indeed, while the ISI does include some non-military officials, they are usually not senior. Most often, any separation is designed to allow the government plausible deniability more
than anything else.

President Musharraf’s own career offers ample testimony to the close working relationship between the military and the ISI and should serve as a cautionary tale to those now arguing that he is at the “courageous forefront” of the battle against extremism and
supports efforts to “rein in” the ISI. In 1995-1996, the very years that the Taliban advanced rapidly from their base in Kandahar to capture more than two-thirds of Afghanistan, Musharraf was Director-General of Military Operations at Army General Headquarters
in Rawalpindi. He clearly played a key role to play in overseeing Pakistan’s all-out support for the Taliban. Very little ISI assistance to the Taliban militia would have happened without his knowledge and consent. There were also reports that once becoming
Chief of Staff of the Army, General Musharraf personally was responsible for blocking a U.S. plan to use Special Forces to apprehend Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, an effort that would at least have required transit through Pakistan’s air space.

Even after 11 September, General Musharraf initially counselled working with the Taliban and suggested that it would need to be given some role in whatever new government was formed within Afghanistan. In a televised interview in November 2001, Musharraf
argued: “The moderate Taliban are willing to bring about change. They should be accepted in a future administration”.4 4 Humayun Akhtar, “Army is Behind Me, Says Musharraf”, The Nation, 12 November 12, 2001 It was only after intense international pressure
that General Musharraf began publicly to adjust his position, and even after the onset of the allied military campaign, there were still widespread reports of some degree of cooperation between Pakistani intelligence services and Taliban elements fleeing the
fighting. General Musharraf is also widely seen is the key engineer of Pakistan’s disastrous operation in Kargil during May and June 1999. The effort to flood large numbers of extremist fighters and Pakistani regulars across the Line of Control with India
and into key strategic positions in Kashmir relied heavily on direct Pakistani military and intelligence collaboration with these “Jihadi” fighters, and pushed India and Pakistan dangerously close to all out war – a remarkably dangerous prospect given their
nuclear capabilities and rather fragile early warning systems. Many within Pakistan also view the Kargil operation as a deliberate move by the military to embarrass the civilian government of then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and to scuttle the possibility
of détente then emerging on the sub-continent.

While obviously much about Pakistani intelligence remains murky, there is little to suggest that the military and ISI are in anything other than lockstep even today. Pakistan still devotes tremendous resources in essence to spying upon itself.

Given the tremendous challenges facing the country, efforts by intelligence agencies to monitor everyone from journalists to party activists must be viewed as a serious misallocation of resources that undermines development prospects.


“For Pakistan itself, Musharraf’s plan – outlined in an address to the nation this month – signals an end to a quarter century in which political power has flowed gradually yet steadily in the direction of conservative religious forces, turning the country
into a safe haven for extremists.”

Los Angeles Times
29 January 2002

Most fundamentalist religious parties in Pakistan have never developed broad support at the ballot box on those occasions when citizens have been allowed to freely express their will. The two most powerful political parties remain the Pakistan People’s Party
and the Muslim League. Election results during Pakistan’s ten-year experiment with democracy belie alarmist claims that Islamic extremists are on the verge of taking over the state, and the military is the last defence. Periods of representative rule have,
in fact, strengthened moderate democratic forces, not their religious counterparts.

By 1988, when General Zia-ul-Haq’s demise in a mid-air explosion ended over a decade of military rule, state patronage had given Islamic extremist organisations considerable political clout. But when Pakistani citizens were permitted to elect their own representatives,
they voted overwhelmingly for moderate, mainstream secular parties. Electoral support for extremist religious parties, in fact, progressively declined between 1988 and 1999.

The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s, had, for instance, stimulated fears that their success would be replicated in Pakistan. Support for parties such as the Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam (led by Fazlur Rehman) (JUI-F), one of those that had helped
the military to create and sustain the Taliban, however, has been minuscule in every national election. In 1988, the JUI-F obtained seven national assembly seats with 1.84 per cent of total votes; in 1990, six seats with 2.94 per cent of votes; in 1993, four
seats with 2.4 per cent of the vote; and, in 1997, only 2 seats with 1.61 per cent of the votes. Ironically in the 1997 elections, when its Taliban allies had captured 90 per cent of Afghanistan’s territory, the JUI-F was soundly defeated in its Northwest
Frontier stronghold by the Muslim League and failed to win a single seat.

As political parties gear up for the October 2002 polls, the most vocal opponents of the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan, the Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam (led by Samiul Haq) and the JUI-F, are forging an electoral alliance. However, if free and fair
elections are held, the People’s Party and the Muslim League will once again easily prevail. In short, the threat of a groundswell of Islamic extremism at the polls appears to be more mirage than reality. Unfortunately, with the repeated disruptions in the
electoral process, Pakistan’s citizens have had fewer opportunities to underscore this fact than they deserve.


“Certainly, corruption was at the heart of last week’s coup, which removed from office Nawaz Sharif, who looked on as Benazir Bhutto was hauled into court for graft. For her part, Miss Bhutto, convicted along with her husband, earlier had accused Mr. Sharif
of corruption. Then there is the taint attached to supporters on both sides. Just who is clean and who isn’t is almost impossible to figure out. Not surprisingly then, Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s coup met with little dismay from his countrymen.”

Far Eastern Economic Review Editorial
October 28, 1999

From President Musharraf’s own comments when justifying his coup in October 1999 to those of western diplomats and editorial writers, the corruption of civilian political leaders has often been cited as a rationale for military leadership. There is no question
that the People’s Party and the Muslim League, particularly during the tenures of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, were marked by corrupt practices and official abuses, often on a systematic level. Bhutto’s continued insistence that she should serve as “chairwoman
for life” of the People’s Party is fundamentally undemocratic and provides commentators with plentiful ammunition that the political parties are little more than cults of personality. Her relatively cavalier responses to credible charges of corruption have
also diminished international confidence in Pakistan’s political process. Similarly, efforts by Sharif late in his tenure to push through questionable constitutional changes helped erode the rule of law and hasten a showdown with the military.

However, corruption in Pakistan is hardly limited to elected officials or the dominant political parties. The country continues to suffer from systematic and widespread corruption across political parties, judiciary, military, civil bureaucracy, police,
and intelligence services. Indeed, the notion that the military is somehow a “cleaner” institution should be greeted sceptically. The military and intelligence services still continue to command the lion’s share of the national budget with almost zero accountability
or public oversight. Scandals in recent years concerning military procurement have only emphasised the lack of transparency in military acquisitions. The military, which controls the borders, is also well positioned to profit from taxes and tariffs, both formal
and informal.

The military has also consistently used the distribution of state land which it controls – often in prime locations in larger cities – as an extensive patronage network for officers. Most of the latter readily admit that General Musharraf’s tenure has been
generous for such “benefits” – perhaps even more so than earlier civilian administrations. It is also interesting that Pakistan’s ratings in Transparency International’s annual corruption perception index declined from 1998 to 2001. Musharraf has not created
a greatly improved sense of accountability despite the extraordinary legal tools available if his government were serious about prosecuting corruption cases beyond those largely designed for political purposes.

The international perception of the military government as less corrupt may also stem from the fact that since 1999 there has simply been less money flowing into Pakistan and thus

consequently less to misappropriate, a trend that recent events have reversed rather dramatically. Given that assistance to Pakistan will be increasing significantly – not as a result of improved economic performance but because of the global war on terrorism
– prospects for greatly improved accountability within a military dictatorship seem tenuous at best. A number of retired military officials who spoke with ICG directly expressed their hope that the West would not resume large-scale military assistance because
they feared it would only make much needed reforms more problematic.

Many pro-democracy activists in Pakistan, while acknowledging the depth and perniciousness of corruption across society, argue that “If all of our governments are going to be corrupt, why shouldn’t we at least be able to elect them?” Certainly, accountability
across society will not occur without strengthened public institutions that improve transparency and promote the rule of law. However, continued military rule will do little to make progress on any of these fronts.


“Musharraf is now in the Ataturk position, a dictator deploying absolute power for the apparently paradoxical ends of modernising and democratising. Like Ataturk, he has to work in chaotic conditions to create a nation-state capable of dealing
with the difficulties it faces. He made his existential choice when he broke with the Taliban, joined the American coalition, and opened local air bases to American aircraft. He has also purged senior generals in the army and the ISI who were Islamists and
promoters of the “strategic depth”
doctrine that has wreaked such havoc. He has banned Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba and several other terror groups as well, closing 500 of their offices and ordering the tracking of their funds with the aim of freezing them. In the most fraught part of
this U-turn, he has had arrested an estimated 2,000 militants who until now were secretly subsidised and encouraged by the ISI. He describes madrassahs correctly as places that ‘propagate hatred and violence,’ and in the future they will have to register with
the authorities and teach modern courses. Rival politicians and influential opinion-makers who hitherto have criticised Musharraf for usurping democratic rule are now coming around to him because Pakistan has changed course and will not become an extremist
Islamist state.”

The National Review
25 February 2002

The government of Pakistan has taken a number of important steps in recent months, including sharply curtailing its direct support for the Taliban, widely making its bases available for allied forces, shifting its rhetoric, clamping down on public fundraising
by extremist groups, banning several of the most notorious Islamic extremist groups and detaining a significant a number of militants. While on the surface it is easy to portray this as a 180-degree policy turn, this claim bears closer analysis. Indeed, it
remains to be seen whether the moves amount to a fundamental strategic shift or rather simply a series of tactical moves designed to curry favour with the West while maintaining the military’s dominant position.

In several areas, there is far less change then meets the eye. First, the military government was the over-arching institution in Pakistan’s public life before 11 September, and despite modest moves, it appears the October 2002 election will be so heavily engineered
as to constitute only a veneer of a genuinely competitive electoral process. Already the government has widely curtailed the eligibility of potential candidates, added a substantial number of parliamentary seats for “technocrats” that it hopes to control and
stacked the high courts. Through selective accountability, Musharraf is attempting to eliminate his civilian rivals. Sentenced to life imprisonment for hijacking Musharraf’s plane at the time of the coup, former Prime Minister Sharif has been exiled to Saudi
Arabia. Cases have been instituted to prevent Bhutto from running.

At the same time, Musharraf has created an alternative civilian clientele through nominal local bodies and by encouraging the break up of the Muslim League. The splinter group of the latter, the Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam), headed by former Punjab Governor
Mian Mohammad Azhar, is more than likely to receive governmental patronage during the elections. Since Musharraf has also appointed a pliant Election Commissioner, former Supreme Court Chief Justice Irshad Hussain Khan, it is equally unlikely that the election
commission will question or curb malpractice.

General Musharraf is well on the way to acquiring an additional five-year presidential term virtually by military fiat. He has openly told local political leaders that he would like to serve an additional five-year term after that – giving him at least thirteen
years of uncontested military rule. This contrasts sharply with his comments in October 1999 after he assumed power when he assured the bation and the world, “The armed forces have no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely necessary to pave
the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan.” Musharraf has also revealed his intention to restore the president’s

power to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve the legislature. Further, by establishing a potential military-dominated National Security Council with de facto veto over the actions of an elected prime minister and parliament, military officials are seeking
to ensure control over Pakistan’s government in perpetuity.

It would appear to be no coincidence that the military is pushing through these extra- constitutional measures when its international standing is at a high water mark because of its cooperation with the anti-terrorism campaign. Senior Pakistani officials
have acknowledged off the record that they have been told directly by the Bush administration that Washington would prefer to see General Musharraf remain in power for a number of years. If true, it would constitute extraordinarily poor judgement to endorse
what must be considered a military dictatorship over a legitimate democratic process. That choice can be shown almost always to result in more instability, not less, over the long term. Pakistan has never been able to develop full civilian control over its
military. The fact that it has fought three wars with India since Independence while failing to make much needed investments in public education and health underscores the high cost of marginalising the country’s civilian leadership.

The events of 11 September also appear to have done little to fundamentally shift the Pakistani military’s approach to Kashmir despite tactical adjustments. After the 13 December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament and the large Indian military build-
up on the Line of Control, Pakistan appears to have curtailed its support for cross border raids by “Jihadi” groups. However, given the close scrutiny by both India and the United States to activities across the Line of Control, this appears more expediency
than good will and not real abandonment of proxy war. President Musharraf has repeatedly made it clear publicly that Pakistan will not lessen its commitment to the cause of Kashmir.

Addressing gatherings on Kashmir Solidarity Day on 5 February 2002, he condemned India for attempting to “mislead the world community by projecting the indigenous struggle of the Kashmiri people as terrorists”, and reiterated Pakistan’s diplomatic, political
and moral support for “their struggle that includes the blood of thousands of martyrs”.5 5 Roshan Mughal, “Musharraf Seeks World Help on Kashmir”, The Nation, 6 February, 2002.

It would be no surprise if the ISI continues to support insurgent groups both in Kashmir and elsewhere in India with funds and intelligence while reducing cross border raids. Indeed, there are some indications on the ground that Pakistan is moving in this direction.
Such an approach would maintain the larger Pakistani strategy to bleed India as a means either to achieve a favourable settlement on Kashmir or “internationalise” the conflict. Continuing to embrace such a strategy would only ensure that tensions with India
are maintained, hobbling Pakistan’s prospects for economic and social development.

Similarly, only time will tell if the ISI and Pakistan’s military can approach Afghanistan with relative restraint. The upcoming Loya Jirga process should provide a useful barometer of Pakistan’s desire to control whatever government sits in Kabul. A long history
of meddling in Afghan affairs has most often proved counterproductive and left Islamabad with an unstable neighbour and host to millions of refugees. While Pakistan has been far from alone in pursuing such ill-advised policies in Afghanistan, it has often
suffered the most as a result. This again highlights the dangers of having the military and intelligence services act without a civilian brake on their foreign policy activities.

Lastly, amid suggestions that the military and intelligence services do not wish to alienate fringe parties as the electoral process is manipulated in the run-up to October, there continue to be serious questions regarding the scale to which Musharraf has
actually cracked down on extremist groups. There are few indications that the military government has made a serious attempt to reform the madrassas system or to push through core changes in its curricula. On the contrary, a number of government officials
continue to make highly supportive statements to officials running these religious schools, and efforts to develop educational alternatives have seen little progress. In fact, the military government lauds the social and economic contributions made by religious
seminaries, denies it intends to crack down on them and emphasises that it is aiming only at ending sectarian terrorism. “Western countries either lack information or lack sincerity about madaris”, noted Musharraf’s Minister for Religious Affairs, Dr. Mehamood
Ahmad Ghazi, who also categorically claimed, “It is absolutely clear that no religious school is involved in the training of terrorists”.6 6 Waseem Abbasi, “Madaris not involved in Terrorism: Ghazi”, The Nation, 13 February 2001.

The murder of Wall Street Journal correspondent Daniel Pearl by Jaish-I-Mohammad activists and sectarian killings of Shias by Sunni terrorists are hardly evidence of government success in reining in extremists. The government needs to take immediate steps to
identify and close down madrassas that give military training to religious extremists. Those responsible for propagating religious hate and for terror acts must be arrested and tried in courts of law. But jihadis will continue to flourish if the state and
its intelligence agencies support their activities in Afghanistan or Kashmir.

Western news reports claim the military government is disbanding ISI units with close links to Kashmiri and Afghan jihadis,77 Douglas Jehl, “Pakistan to Cut Islamist Links to Spy Agency”, The New York Times, 20 February 2002. reassigning personnel, and restricting
activities to information gathering. Transferring personnel will make little difference, however, until ISI’s internal and external missions are severely restricted, and the agency is subjected to civilian oversight. At present, the ISI charter, according
to former chief Hameed Gul, is broadly defined to include “counter intelligence, operational intelligence security, security of the three services, items related to national security” and an internal political cell.8 8 Dayan Hasan, “What is a Prime Minister?—General
Hameed Gul, former DG ISI”, Herald, January 2001, p. 62. Even if this mandate is restricted, oversight would be impossible without a sovereign parliament and rule of law.


Pakistan has an essential role to play in promoting security and stability in both South and Central Asia. The government of Pervez Musharraf has widely, although not universally, cooperated with the international alliance’s anti-terrorism campaign, and a strategy
of engagement with Pakistan certainly makes more sense than a policy of isolation at this time. That said, the international community should approach Pakistan and its problems with open eyes. Offering tacit support for quasi-military rule into the indefinite
future, may make it more difficult, not less, to tackle the foundations of Pakistan’s insecurity.

A strong, secure and stable Pakistan will need to be built on a far more robust economy, aggressive efforts to educate a population where more than 50 per cent of students drop out by the American equivalent of the third grade, establishing the rule of law
and unshackling a robust civil society that can combat pervasive corruption. All these efforts will demand resources and need to be supported by the public. However, as long as Pakistan’s military and intelligence services continue to claim the lion’s share
of the national budget – official estimates are at least 29 per cent, with actual figures likely much higher – it is difficult to believe that Pakistan will be able to meet its challenges.

As the single wealthiest, most powerful and influential institution in Pakistan, whose generals receive generous perks on a regular basis, the military is unlikely to limit its own broad reach voluntarily. Indeed, it is remarkable that generous U.S. assistance
will flow to a country where the large military budget is approved only as a single line item by the parliament – a lack of transparency that encourages corruption as fundamental in the military establishment as in any of Pakistan’s other institutions.

It is also difficult to think that Pakistan’s military will make a good faith effort to resolve its myriad of tensions with India, when those have often been used as the prime justification by the military for its over-arching domestic role. Very few institutions
would embrace any peace agreement that would seem to ensure their own increasing marginalisation, which provides all the more reason for the international community to put pressure on Pakistan to achieve an actual democracy rather than simply its veneer.

There continues to be tremendous thirst and demand for genuine democracy in Pakistan, a remarkable fact given the travails that the country has experienced. While the notion of “managed democracy” may appeal both to the generals in Pakistan and to the short
term interests of western planners, the deep, systematic and institutional challenges that face Pakistan will only be surmounted when the country has a competitive and fair political process that allows the will of the people to be heard.

Islamabad/Brussels, 12 March 2002
Further information about ICG can be obtained from our website:

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18992/PAKISTAN++THE+DANGERS+OF+CONVENTIONAL+WISDOM++International+Crisis+Group+Report+Islamabad+Brussels+March+12+2002

MEA Kaluchak Massacre 14 May 2002

Details of the incident:

  • Three terrorists dressed in combat uniform boarded a Himachal Tourism bus, moving from Pathankot to Jammu at Vijaypur (near Samba) early morning on \14 may 02. At 0615 hours these terrorists stopped the bus near Kaluchak, shot the driver and the conductor
    of the bus and opened indiscriminate fire on the passengers inside the bus.
  • On hearing the sound of fire, sentries of Army Unit located in the vicinity, opened fire in the direction of the terrorists. Terrorists, while returning the fire, attempted to escape in the direction of army family lines, located to the main road. They
    also threw grenades on some vehicles parked in the vicinity. On entering the family lines they again fired indiscriminately on Army family members present in the premises.
  • In the Army family lines, the terrorist were cordoned off. All three terrorists were killed by 1000 hours.
  • Details of the Casualties:

    Details of the casualties are as follows:
    (a) Killed: 31 including 03 Army personnel, 18 Army family members and 10 civilians.
    (b) Wounded: 47 including 12 Army personnel, 20 Army family members and 15 civilians.

  • List of Deceased:
    • Army Personnel:
      The under mentioned personnel of army sustained Gun Shot Wounds due to terrorist fire at Kaluchak on 14 May 02 at 0600 hrs and were declared brought in dead at the local Military Hospital (MH):
    • Havildar Roop Chand
    • Battalion Havildar Major Manjeet Singh
    • Havildar M.S. Chauhan
    • Dependents of Army Personnel: The following dependents of Army Personnel died in the incident mentioned above. These personnel were evacuated to the local MH and were declared brought in dead/died while being evacuated:
    • Mrs. Premwati (40 yrs) W/o Subedar J.N. Yadav.
    • Mrs. Avlodhan Devi ( 65yrs) M/o Company Quarter Master Havildar (CQMH) RDP Singh
    • Ms. Muli (6 yrs) D/o CQMH RDP Singh
    • Ms. Nitu (14 yrs) D/o Havildar H.S Chauhan.
    • Mrs. Raya Chauhan ( 30 yrs) W/o Havildar Chauhan.
    • Mrs. Lalita Kumari (26 yrs) W/o CQMH R.K. Yadav.
    • Master Amit Yadav (5 yrs) S/o CQMH R.K. Yadav.
    • Ms. Amandeep Kaur (5 yrs) D/o Subedar Attar Singh
    • Master Jitender Singh (12 yrs) S/o Subedar Attar Singh
    • Ms. Dimple (18 yrs) D/o Subedar Gurdev Singh.
    • Mrs Jaswinder Kaur ( 45 Yrs ) W/O Subedar Gurdev Singh
    • Mrs Joginder Kaur (21 Yrs) W/O Lance Naik Harbhajan Singh
    • Master Devender Singh ( 3 Yrs) S/O Battalion Havildar Major Manjeet Singh
    • Mrs Baljit Kaur (30 Yrs) W/O Sepoy Gurlal Singh
    • Ms Amandeep Kaur ( 2 Yrs) D/O Sepoy Gurlal Singh
    • Mrs Punam Devi (38 Yrs) W/O Havildar Surendra Kumar
    • Ms Anchal (8 Yrs) D/O Havildar Surendra Kumar
    • Ms Gagan Deep Kaur ( 2 Months) D/O Battalion Havildar Major Manjeet Singh died at the local MH at 2330 hrs on 14 May 02
    • Civilian wounded in attack and who died at the local MH:. S/O Mr Sabir Ahmed R/O Kupwara – Died on 14 May 2002.
    • Civilians wounded in attack and who died at the local MH (Unidentified). Two adult males – Died on 14 May 2002
    • Civilians wounded in attack and who died at Govt. Medical College, Jammu:
    • Mrs Parmeshwari W/O Mr Bhagat Ram
    • Mr Kishanji Raina
    • Ms Sunaina Devi W/O Mr Bhoop Singh
    • Mr Bhoop Singh
    • Mr Prem Singh
    • Two Unidentified bodies
  • Terrorists involved in massacre:
    • All the three terrorists killed in this incident have been identified as Pakistani Nationals. They were Abu Suhail, son of Abdulah, resident of Faislabad, Pakistan, Abu Murshed (Mohammed Munir), son of Mehzabin Shah Jeb Resident of Gali no. 1, Salamatpura,
      Rahwali Cantt, District Gujranwala, Pakistan and Abu Javed (Amzad Salam Bin Mohammed Gisha), son of Amir Bin Jabbi resident of Village Guda Giriya, Nosar Ali Khan, District Gujranwala, Pakistan.
    • Certain food items like biscuits and chocolates found on the persons of these terrorists also reveal that these items were purchased from Zaffarwal, Pakistan.
    • These terrorists aged 19 to 20 years who were responsible for the cold blooded massacre at Kaluchak on May 14, 2002 had reportedly infiltrated across the LoC (Line of Control) in Samba area and boarded the Jammu bound Himachal Roadways bus at Vijaypur.

May 17, 2002

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18990/Kaluchak+Massacre+14+May+2002

MEA International Community condemns massacre of innocent people by terrorists in Jammu

President George W. Bush condemns terrorist attack in Kaluchak.

In a telephonic conversation with Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on May 15, 2002, President George Bush of the United States said that the terrorist massacre in the Kaluchak area of Jammu was a “terrible and outrageous act” and that he was “appalled at
the incident”. He expressed his understanding at India’s distress. Prime Minister thanked him for his message of sympathy and condolence and said India will take appropriate action.

US Assistant Secretary of State, Christina B. Rocca Condemns Jammu Terrorist Attack:


“Before I begin my formal remarks, I would like, on behalf of my government, to condemn unequivocally the terrorist attack in Jammu this morning. It is just this type of barbarism that the war on terrorism is determined to stop. I express my sympathies to the
families of the victims.”


Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the terrorist attack in Kaluchak ( Jammu and Kashmir) ( Brussels, 15 May, 2002)

The Presidency, on behalf of the European Union, strongly condemns Tuesday’s brutal terrorist attack in Kaluchak ( Jammu and Kashmir), which resulted in the death of numerous innocent civilians.

This unspeakable act, by its viciousness and brutality, constitutes an appalling example of terrorism, which the international coalition endeavours to eradicate. The Presidency reiterates that no possible excuse or justification can condone such a barbaric

The Presidency also wishes to express its deepest sympathy to the Government of India and to the bereaved families the victims of this attack.


Statement by the Press Secretary /Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1. The Government of Japan strongly condemns the terrorist attach in an Indian army camp located at kaluchak on the outskirts of Jammu city, which took place on May 14. It expressed its deep sorrow over the people who died by this attack and condolences to
the bereaved families.

2. The Government of Japan maintains firmly its position that terrorism cannot be justified, whatever kind of it may be, and resolutely condemns again terrorism in any form as we reconfirmed in our Japan-India Joint Declaration, which Japanese and Indian Prime
Ministers made in Tokyo on December 10, 2001.


German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer issued a statement on 14 May condemning the terrorist attack near Jammu. A translation of the statement is as follows:


” The Federal Government is dismayed and shocked. It condemns with all its might the terrorist attack on a bus in Kashmir, which today claimed the lives of 30 victims. Nothing can justify the use of terrorist force against the civilian population. Our sympathies
are with the victims and their families.”


Russia The Russian Foreign Minister issued a statement on 15.5.02 afternoon on the terrorist attack near Jammu on 14th May. Full text in translation is as follows:

On the terrorist attack in the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir

On 14 May in the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir, there was an armed attack on a passenger bus travelling from the State of Himachal Pradesh to a cantonment of the Indian army. As a result of this incident more than 50 people including from the army, their
families and civilians were killed or wounded.

Moscow severely condemns the crime and sees it as another provocation of extremist forces interested in the destabilisation of the situation in the region.

In this context, we express our sincere condolences to the Indian side.

Such terrorist acts once again confirm that terrorists, irrespective of their nationality or the place where the crime is committed, are all alike and headed by those with utter disregard to human life. Reaction to such activities can only be one – decisive
and uncompromising struggle against terrorism and its manifestations”.

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18991/International+Community+condemns+massacre+of+innocent+people+by+terrorists+in+Jammu

MEA US Assistant Secretary of State Condemns Jammu Terrorist Attack

Transforming US-India Relations by Christina B. Rocca, US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs


“Before I begin my formal remarks, I would like, on behalf of my government, to condemn unequivocally the terrorist attack in Jammu this morning. It is just this type of barbarism that the war on terrorism is determined to stop. I express my sympathies to the
families of the victims.”

Speech: As Prepared for Delivery

Thank you for those kind words, Bob. We in Washington know how fortunate we are to have you here as American Ambassador to India. You are doing a superb job and you personally have done so much to push this bilateral relationship forward.

Distinguished members of the Confederation of Indian Industry, Ladies and Gentlemen: Thank you for asking me to speak to this distinguished gathering. I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk to you about the transformation in relations between the United
States and India. Our two democracies are working together more intensely than ever before to make the world freer, more peaceful, and more prosperous.

From the start of his Administration, President Bush has sought a global approach to US-India relations to engage India on the whole range of issues that currently confront the international community. No matter what the issue, whether it is counter-terrorism,
national defense, global climate change, international commerce or preventing HIV/AIDS, the President has looked to India as a partner.

The most topical area of this partnership is in our military to military relations, and these offer an impressive illustration of the way in which India-US ties are moving from the discussion stage to active cooperation.

Today, not far from Agra, Indian paratroopers and American special operations forces are participating in their largest-ever joint army and air exercise since India’s independence. Although I love Agra, and fondly remember my first visit there, I certainly
do not envy our soldiers and flight crews their first visit in this heat.

The specific goal of the exercise is to conduct joint parachute training and mutual familiarization with small arms. But the larger, long-term goal is much more ambitious, and is based on strategic, diplomatic and political cooperation as well as sound economic
ties. Military to military cooperation, long a subject of discussion between us, is now producing tangible progress towards this objective. Indian and US military forces are now actively developing the capability to work together effectively. Such cooperative
activity between military organizations is a normal aspect of relations between friendly countries and I anticipate more such exercises to follow Agra.

Even though this joint exercise is an important milepost, it is only the latest indicator of the impressive growth in military cooperation between India and the United States. The US and Indian navies have also conducted exercises and US Navy ships have made
seven port visits in the past few months.

The Defense Policy Group was revived in December and will hold its second meeting next week, on May 21. It provides the framework for planning and coordination for our military relationship. Within that framework, other bodies, such as the Executive Steering
Groups for the Army, Navy and Air Force and functional working groups have discussed technological and research and development cooperation, sales and licensing issues and peacekeeping cooperation.

The defense supply relationship between Indian and America has been notable in that it involves the private sector as well as government. I was pleased to see that CII, our National Defense Industrial Association and the US India Business Council co-hosted
a day of important interaction between our defense industries. Furthermore, our armed services are determining areas of mutual interest in basic research for military purposes and identification of areas for joint work in future defense system development.

In late April, we capped all of this activity with the visit of Assistant Secretary of State Lincoln Bloomfield. He was in New Delhi to begin a formal political military dialogue that, along with the visit to Washington by India’s Chief of the Army Staff, will
help both our countries better appreciate each other’s national goals and military strategies as well as coordinate our defense trade.

The growing military relationship is one important element of the far broader process of transformation occurring between our two countries in the areas of strategic and technical cooperation. But there are others. The communiqué issued at the end of the
November Summit meetings between President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee in Washington commits both countries to expanding the scope of our defense-related ties, strengthening our collaboration regarding President Bush’s new strategic framework, resuming
cooperation on civilian nuclear safety and in space science. The Administration remains committed to these goals, and will continue to seek creative and productive ways to implement them.

Nonproliferation remains an important item on our bilateral agenda, which we are addressing through cooperation and mutual understanding. One area in which there is great scope for cooperation is on export controls. We have already had a series of expert-level
discussions and conducted training for Indian customs officials. This cooperation should expand over time, encompassing dialogue, information sharing, training and other assistance. We are confident that the Indian government shares our concerns about preventing
the spread of sensitive technologies since the diffusion of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and missiles pose a serious threat to the security of both our countries.

India and the US are also working together to stimulate bilateral high technology commerce and are discussing several ideas toward that end. We have agreed to the resumption of three nuclear safety-related projects. The chairman of India’s Space Research
Organization has met in the US with American counterparts to expand civilian space cooperation on areas such as weather, migration and communications.

Over the past several months, the US and India have built a vibrant relationship in the war against terrorism. This began immediately after the September 11 attacks on the United States, when Prime Minister Vajpayee and other Indian leaders offered their help
ungrudgingly and generously. This offer was a splendid act of solidarity with the American people at a time of urgent need.

South Asia is a key front in the global war on terrorism. And India has been a vital ally in the campaign to destroy the al-Qaida organization, extract it from its safe havens and end its predations against the Afghan people. Dismantling the structure of extremism
and terror must go hand in hand with addressing and eliminating its root causes. Achieving these goals in South Asia has involved diplomatic efforts on many fronts:

The diplomatic cooperation between India and America in pursuit of these goals has been unprecedented in our relationship. We have worked together in the UN to build support for UNSCR 1373 and the India-sponsored Comprehensive Convention Against International
Terrorism. Our cooperation has contributed to the arrest of hundreds of terrorists around the world. The United States and India have moved in unison to strangle the financial assets of terrorists and well over 100 nations have issued blocking orders and frozen
assets used to finance their attacks.

Moving from diplomatic efforts against terrorism to the more practical aspects of our struggle, I am pleased that US-India counter-terrorism cooperation is rapidly maturing. The US-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism predates 9/11 and continues
to expand and deepen. Convening for the fourth time in January, the US and India broke new ground across the full range of counter-terrorist efforts including intelligence sharing, training, terrorism finance and money laundering, border security, and cyber-terrorism.

On broader law enforcement issues, we also are steadily increasing the number of our joint activities. We signed a new bilateral treaty last October providing for cooperation and mutual legal assistance, that makes it easier for American and Indian law enforcement
agencies to tackle international crime.

As the two top centers of development of computer software in the world, India and the US are natural partners in another front of the war against terrorism – cyber terrorism. Just over two weeks ago our two countries held their first formal consultations on
how to combat new emerging threats to our critical national infrastructures. The talks involved representatives of government agencies as well as academic experts and marked the start of a regular interaction on cyber security. Our professional-level dialogue,
conducted, from here on, through the new US-India Cyber-Security Forum, will be continuous as we work to protect both Indian and American societies from the threats of cyber attack. We will hold the next JWG in Washington in July.

The success of the Bonn Conference that established an interim government in Afghanistan owes much to US-Indian cooperation. Working together, American and Indian negotiators convinced Afghan participants to reach agreement on the Bonn Accords. But Bonn
was just the beginning. Afghanistan will require constant and intense international attention and support in order to overcome the legacy of more than 20 years of violence.

Accomplishing this task will be exceedingly difficult for the Afghans, even with outside help. India-US collaboration will play a crucial role in meeting the challenge of restoring stability in Afghanistan. India, like the United States, has been a major contributor
of relief and reconstruction assistance for that blighted country.

An even greater challenge, and one I anticipate with real optimism, is to repeat our mutually supportive diplomatic efforts for all of South Asia, the adjoining regions of Southeast Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, and the world as a whole, including
close cooperation within the UN system. The United States and India remain co-chairs of the Community of Democracies and will continue to work together to promote democracy throughout the world. Our collaboration can only make the world a safer and more just

The pace of our engagement on the economic front has also picked up. Since January, we’ve seen visits by senior USG officials from the Departments of Treasury, Energy and Commerce and from the Environmental Protection Agency. During the same period, Ministers
Sinha and Mahajan and other cabinet rank officers of the Indian Government have been in the United States for productive discussions with their counterparts. We look forward to enhancing these kinds of interactions under the framework of the US-India Economic
Dialogue, which the President and Prime Minister reinvigorated last November. With the active participation of our respective private sectors, the Economic Dialogue can and will play an important role in helping us realize the enormous potential of our economic

Our partnership extends from the macro level of politics, economics and diplomacy to the community level where HIV/AIDS has become a growing problem. Here, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) supports two major bilateral projects and is planning
to incorporate HIV prevention into other activities.

It is clear that our two countries have embarked on a new and more productive course in bilateral relations. This is a change that supports the interests of us both. The United States is committed to move rapidly and decisively toward even greater cooperation
in this partnership of equals. I believe Indians are also excited about the transformation of our relationship as it demonstrates your country’s assumption of ever-greater responsibilities as a major power in the region and in the global arena. The US-India
relationship is entering an exciting phase, a period of transformation which, if properly managed, can bring great benefits to both our countries. This will require constant attention and hard work. I think India and the United States have demonstrated their
willingness to do this hard work, to overcome difficulties and keep our eyes on the benefits for us both. I am confident that together we will succeed.

Thank you.

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18989/US+Assistant+Secretary+of+State+Condemns+Jammu+Terrorist+Attack

MEA Fact Sheet on Jammu & Kashmir

The Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India-1947

The accession of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir to India took place in terms of the India Independence Act. The Act provided that the rulers of the princely states had to take the final decision whether they wished to join India or Pakistan. There
was no provision in the Act for any recourse to ascertaining the wishes of the people. These were the terms under which other princely states also acceded to India or Pakistan.

While the signatory to the offer of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was the ruler of the state, Maharaja Hari Singh, Sheikh Abdullah, a Muslim, and the acknowledged political leader of the State, endorsed the decision. His rationale for endorsing the
accession was “.if we accede to India there is no danger of a revival of feudalism and autocracy. Moreover, during the last four years, the Government of India has never tried to interfere in our internal autonomy. This experience has strengthened our confidence
in them as a democratic State. … The Indian Constitution has amply and finally repudiated the concept of a religious State, which is a throwback to medievalism, by guaranteeing the equality of rights of all citizens irrespective of their religion, colour,
caste and class.

The national movement in our State naturally gravitates towards these principles of secular democracy. The people here will never accept a principle which seeks to favour the interests of one religion or social group against another. This affinity in political
principles, as well as in past association, and our common path of suffering in the cause of freedom, must he weighed properly while deciding the future of the State…”

The accession was final and irrevocable. There was no question of a conditional acceptance by the Governor General for the simple reason that the legal framework defined for the future of the princely states under the Indian Independence Act did not have
any provision for a conditional accession.

The Raids of 1947 and later.

Pakistan has always sought to use deniable violence to achieve its objective of wresting Jammu and Kashmri from India.

In order to force the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan , Pakistan engineered the so called tribal raids in 1947 and seized part of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. It is a travesty of the truth to suggest that the raids were spontaneous. They were organized
and coordinated by the Government of Pakistan as detailed by the Pakistan Army Officer Akbar Khan , who was in charge of the tribal lashkars and who gives full details of the operational plan in his book ” Raiders in Kashmir” “..”…. I wrote out a plan under
the title ” Armed Revolt inside Kashmir” . As open interference or aggression by Pakistan was obviously not desirable it was proposed that our efforts should be concentrated upon strengthening the Kashmiris internally — and .. to prevent arrival of armed
civilian or military assistance from India into Kashmir…”

The use of deniable violence by Pakistan continued in the decades after Partition. In 1965 Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar which eventually led to the 1965 Indo Pakistan war. Lt. General Gul Hassan writes in ‘Memoirs’ “….In 1963 our government decided
to extend some form of moral support to the people of Indian-held Kashmir. Consequently, the Army was ordered to train volunteers in carrying out sabotage activities across the Cease-fire Line…

…We were told that the President had ordered that GHQ was required to prepare two sets of plans – first, intensification of the firecracker type of activity that was already current, but the embargo on regular troops crossing the Cease-fire Line remained.
The second task given to GHQ was to plan all-out support for any guerrillas who were inducted into the Indian-held part of Kashmir…..

..The decision to mount guerrilla operations in Indian-held Kashmir was taken shortly after the Kutch affair…..

Following the Soviet Unions withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan decided to use the Mujahideen to foment trouble in Jammu and Kashmir. In ‘ Fateh’ the biography of the former Chief of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence, General Akhtar Abdul Rehman his
biographer Brigadier Haroon Rashid states “…The plan which General Akhtar Abdul Rehman had made for Kashmiris movement for independence was to come into effect in 1991. It appears that this plan was made with the struggle for the liberation of Afghanistan
in mind, which it was though would be achieved by spring 1989…. However the Kashmir plan was inaugurated in 1984.. The Kashmiris were provided with some arms which were not suitable for the Afghan Mujahideen …

In the Kargil incursion also Pakistan pretended that only the “mujahideen” were fighting the Indian forces when there is sufficient documentary evidence from Pakistani sources, including obituary notices, to indicate that the operation was planned and carried
out by the Pakistan army with the mujahideen used as camouflage.

Pakistan has all along denied that any terrorist groups operate from its soil and had even been insisting that the Lashkar e Taiba , the Harkat ul Mujahideen and the Jaish e Mohammed were Kashmiri outfits with no presence in Pakistan. This was contrary to
the evidence as has now been proved by the Pakistani crackdown on these groups and the reported arrests of hundreds of their members. These groups have over the years published advertisements in Pakistani newspapers and in their own publications giving their
office addresses in Pakistan and their telephone numbers and bank accounts and soliciting money for the jehad against India. They have also published names of their cadres killed in Jammu and Kashmir. The majority of these cadres are Pakistanis.

The United Nations.

It is a fallacy to suggest that the United Nations was charged with the responsibility of deciding on the status of Jammu and Kashmir. India took the matter of Pakistan’s aggression against Jammu and Kashmir to the United Nations, after the State had become
a part of India in terms of a perfectly legally executed accession in accordance with the terms of the Indian Independence Act.

Pakistan’s insistence that Indian must hold a plebiscite is also wrong. The resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, which India endorsed, required that first Pakistan withdraw from the territories it had seized. Only after this
and other conditions spelt out in the resolution had been completed was there any question of any plebiscite being considered. Pakistan has still not complied with the preliminary conditions of the resolutions and continues to occupy the territory of Jammu
and Kashmir.

The UN Resolutions had, in the words of Gunnar Jarring and Dr. Frank Graham lost their relevance to the question as far back as 1957-58. In his report to the Council in 1957 Gunnar Jarring said “..The Council will, furthermore, be aware of the fact that
the implementation of international agreements of an ad hoc character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change…”

Dr. Frank Graham , the UNCIP’s representative stated in March 1958 “…the execution of the provisions of the resolution of 1948 might create more serious difficulties than were foreseen at the time the parties agreed to that. Whether the UN representative
would be able to reconstitute the status quo which it had obtained ten years ago would seem to be doubtful. ..”

Over fifty years after Partition the ground situation of the state to which the resolutions referred to has considerably changed. Pakistan has unilaterally ceded a part of the state to China. There has been a demographic change on the Pakistani side with generations
of non – Kashmiris allowed to take up residence in the parts of J&K occupied by Pakistan. If the resolutions had begun to lose relevance even in 1957, they have far less relevance now.

The contention that the people of Jammu and Kashmir have not been able to express their wishes is also wrong. Since 1947 the people of Jammu and Kashmir ( Ladakh, Jammu and the Valley) have participated in elections and till 1987 there was no talk of their
aspirations not having been met. The only change that has taken place is that a group of people from the Valley, unable to come to power over the decades through the ballot box have decided to use violence to impose their will. In this they have been aided
by jehadi elements from Pakistan. If indeed they are confident that they represent the wishes of the people of the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, they should be ready to participate in elections as other Muslim Kashmiris from the Valley and other parts
of Jammu and Kashmir have done. Instead this group has been engaged in calling for a boycott of the democratic electoral process and countenanced the destruction of the social, cultural and economic fabric of Jammu and Kashmir.

If indeed there is any part of the state where the people have had no chance to articulate their aspirations in a democratic manner it is the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan, under Pakistan’s control where since 1947 there has been no adult franchise
or any democratic election.

Violence in Jammu and Kashmir.

The enclosed annexure gives details of the number of people who have been killed, the property destroyed and the weapons seized since the violence began in the Kashmir Valley over a decade ago. The Valley has no hinterland except Pakistan, which has been the
source of weaponry and training for the groups engaging in violence in Jammu and Kashmir. Mr. Ziauddin , Resident Editor of the Dawn in Islamabad has succinctly spelt out the position in comments to the BBC “”because all these groups have been getting their
inspiration from the Pakistani army.

In the last 15- 20 years, the Pakistani establishment’s policy in Afghanistan as well as in Kashmir has been rather favourable to the Jehadis. In one way, you can even say that they have been sponsored, they have been trained, they have been funded by the



In recent years and especially since 1990, the main theater of Pak sponsored activity in India has been the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which has seen the loss of about 27,000 lives in the last 11 years. The number of weapons and other military hardware
recovered in anti-terrorist operations could equip several battalions of a modern Army During the decade long Pak sponsored terrorism in J&K, in over 51,000 terrorist incidents around 27,000 persons including about 9,700 civilians and over 3000 Security personnel
have been killed. The terrorist violence caused extensive damage to private and public property, with large number of people, particularly minority Hindus, being forced to migrate from the Valley. Even foreign tourists have not been spared. Terrorists posed
a serious threat to Aviation Security as they resorted to hijacking to achieve their demands. With the decline in local militancy, pan-Islamic ‘jehadi’ outfits have come to dominate seeking to destroy the secular fabric of the State. The complexion of militancy
has undergone a change with focused attacks on Security Forces (SF). Suicide attacks are on the rise. A systematic effort is being made to tarnish the image of security forces by whipping up allegations of violation of Human Rights even though terrorists have
shown no concern for the human rights of their victims.

2. The terrorists showed total disregard even for the lives of civilians, which is reflected in very high casualties of civilians during the period. The latest weapon in the armory of terrorists namely the fidayeen attack has been used frequently during
this period of ceasefire. Attacks on vital installations have continued unabated. Terrorist’s attempts to target the State democratic apparatus was reflected in their poll boycott threats issued in the wake of announcement of Parliamentary, legislature and
in the last few years and culminated in the October, 2001 attack on the State legislature building. The threat to Census enumerators and attempt to disrupt could also be seen in the same light. Grass roots political workers have continually been targeted by
the terrorists.


1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Since 1990 upto Dec.01
No. of Incidents 4158 3765 4817 5247 5829 5938 5014 3420 2932 3071 3074 4522 5178
Civilians Killed 461 382 634 747 820 1031 1336 948 857 821 762 919 9718
SFs Killed 155 173 189 198 200 237 184 193 236 355 400 536 3053
Terrorists Killed 550 844 819 1310 1596 1332 1209 1075 999 1082 1520 2020 14356
Foreign Militants Killed 14 12 14 90 122 85 139 197 319 305 436 622 2358

Militancy in J&K has taken a toll of 9718 innocent civilians since January 1, 1990. The militants, aided and abetted by Pak ISI have caused enormous damage to Kashmiri people and the economy of the State, even public and private properties have not been
spared by the militants as indicated by the figures given below.


If you destroy schools, you destroy sanity. If you blow up bridges, you demolish the bridges of amity and fraternity. That is what militants have done in Jammu and Kashmir since 1990. The gun and grenade crazy militants set ablaze and blew up 633 school
buildings and 333 bridges during the last years. They thought that by destroying the Govt. buildings they would secure an overthrow of the state administration and hence destroyed 1134 Govt. buildings. As compared to 1999 and 2000 when 18 and 21 Govt buildings
including schools and bridge, were destroyed, the rate of destruction of such buildings increased to 48 in 2001.


The dance of arson and destruction was not confined to the Government property only. Those civilians who had toiled and spent there last penny in building houses were targeted. Militants destroyed houses and shops of the people belonging to both the majority
and the minority communities. In 1990, 1992 and 1995 militants almost went on a rampage and destroyed 5368 houses, shops and other structures of civilians. There was a downward trend between 1998 and 2000. However, in 2001 the number went up to 419.

Year Total Incidents Govt. Buildings Eductional Buildings Bridges Hospital Private House Shops
1990 646 501 129 172 0 1242 202
1991 391 45 24 24 0 819 83
1992 564 65 57 28 0 2312 200
1993 662 98 46 34 0 1110 400
1994 606 172 119 46 4 666 162
1995 688 127 133 16 2 1814 402
1996 482 52 68 2 3 602 161
1997 259 13 11 5 1 437 63
1998 177 13 515 1 0 273 66
1999 136 7 9 2 0 284 6
2000 129 14 6 1 0 330 107
2001 274 30 16 2 1 419 77
Total 1983 1134 633 333 11 10263 1932

Deliberate attempts byterrorists and their mentors across the border have been made to step-upviolence in a desperate effort to try and thwart the restoration of thepolitical and democratic processes in the State. Though the number of terroristrelated incidents
during 2001 was on a lower side than registered in 1995,( i.e5938 highest since the inception of terrorism in the state), it was higher than witnessed during the immediately preceding three years. In 2001, as many as 4522 incidents were recorded against 3074
in 2000 and 3071in 1999.

Despite the Government’s Ramzan Peace during which security forces refrained from initiating combat operations against terrorists the number of incidents during 2001 (4617) showed approximately 50% increase compared to that of 2000 (3074) and was higher
than the year wise figures of any of other preceding calendar years since 1997. The figure of civilians killed also showed an increase to 932 in 2001 (compared to 762 in 2000), which is the highest since 1998. The number of terrorists killed in 2001 (2028)
was the highest since inception of terrorism in the state. The security forces, due to specific targeting by the terrorists, suffered 554 casualties in 2001 compared to 400 persons killed in the preceding calendar year. The SF to terrorists killed ratio which
had at one point gone down to 1:3.3 has now again risen to ratio 1:3.7 though the terrorists today are much better trained, equipped and experienced than before. As stated earlier, after the assembly election in the state in 1996, Pakistan has desperately
tried to pump in foreign mercenaries to provide the cutting edge leadership to militant’s activities in J&K. Now about 1/3 of the total terrorists killed in J&K are foreign mercenaries as indicated by the details of militants and foreign militants killed in
J&K given below:

In 2001 there were as many as 25 Fidayeen or suicide attacks on Government installations and security camps and pickets. The suicide attack on the Assembly Complex in Srinagar on October 1st was the biggest strike in which 11 Police and paramilitary men
and 23 civilians were killed and over 65 wounded. In another attack on an Army convoy at Ramban on November 18 as many as 10 Army men were killed.


1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Cum total
AK Rifles & Pistols 1991 3169 4260 3130 3136 3020 3202 2749 2104 1629 1887 2016 32293
UMG’s 77 130 164 142 127 67 84 64 71 28 21 10 985
Rocket Launcher(s) 108 29 62 36 31 36 43 81 140 42 59 39 706

Both AK-Rifles and pistols became a symbol of status and authority for terrorists who pushed poets, writers and intellectuals to the wall. During the last 12 years 32293 AK rifles & pistols were recovered from the militants and out of this 2016 were seized
during 2001. This trend, definitely, does not go with the Kashmiri culture and ethos. The fanatic and fundamentalist forces are trying to convert the land of Sufis and Saints into a graveyard. The people’s resolve is to thwart it.


(a) Hijacking of Indian Airlines Plane:

Following the arrest of four militants accomplices in Mumbai the Pakistan establishment stands fully exposed, as regards its complicity in the hijacking of the Indian Airlines Flight IC-814 on 22.12.1999, which took off from Kathmandu, All these, four activists
are of the Harkat-ul-Ansar, the fundamentalism tanzeem based in Ralwapindi (Pakistan), which rechristened itself as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen after being declared a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTR) by the U.S. Out of these four activists, two activists were
Pakistani and one Nepali and one Indian from Mumbai. Terrorist from India, was recruited by the ISI while he was in the Gulf Region. He later underwent intensive training in two camps – one in Pakistan and the other in Afghanistan.

2. Interrogation of these four terrorists has confirmed that the Indian Airlines Plane hijack was an ISI operation executed with the assistance of Harkat-ul-Ansar, and further, that all the five hijackers are Pakistanies.

3. Apart from the testimony given by the four Harkat operatives, Pakistan’s complicity in this diabolic episode is borne out by the events that occurred in the course of the hijack episode itself including the fact that a significant percentage of the 36
imprisoned terrorists hijackers asked to be released from Indian Jails were Pakistani.

(b) Chittisinghpora Incident – March 20-21, 2000

Militants have targeted both the majority and minority communities, one of the aims of the Pak sponsored terrorists has been to try to create a communal divide by indulging in group killings of minority community so as to provoke people on communal lines
and also to create scare. In the past they have resorted to mass killing of minority community in District Doda and Udhampur.

2. During the night intervening March 20-21, at about 2200 hours, in a demonstrative action targeting the Sikh community in the Kashmir Valley, a combined group of terrorists suspected to be belonging to Lashkar-e-Toiba and Hizbul Mujahideen shot dead 35
Sikhs at Chittisinghpora village in Anantnag district. The militants wearing army camouflage uniform asked the residents of the village to. Assemble for an army operation and segregated the males from the rest before opening fire. It is a Sikh dominated village.
While retreating, the militants had also set on fire the middle school building in the village.

3. This is one of the most gruesome and ghastly crime perpetrated by the terrorists on the innocent citizens, particularly of Sikh community, with a view to resort to ethnic cleansing of the valley, and try to provoke a communal backlash underlining the
nefarious political designs of the terrorist groups operating in J&K and their mentors across. This was also perhaps an act intended to draw international media attention to the Kashmir imbroglio at a time when the US President was making a visit to this country.
However, in the long run it may not serve the purpose of the terrorists as it had let to a strong backlash from the Sikh Community as also from the US President. This had forced Pakistan not only to denounce the incident but also to try and put the blame on
the doorsteps of Indian intelligence agencies.

4. Subsequent to the Chitisingpora massacre two Pak nationals were arrested in J&K. Of the two Mohd. Suhail Malik @ Assad Suhail @ Amir @ Hafiz, code Abu Saharia R/o Sialkot Pakistan confessed of having been part of the group of LET militants that put on
Army uniform and carried liquor bottles to falsely give the impression that the massacre had been carried out by the Indian Army.

5. The other Pak militant Zahid Hussain @Zahid @ Wasim @Abu Mohamad S/O Mohmad Hussain R/O Gujrnawalla, Pakistan was also part of the same militant group but did not take part in the massacre at Chitisinghpora.

(c) Incidents of attack on Amarnath Yatris in 2000:

A series of ghastly incidents perpetrated by militants taking a toll of as many 80 lives killed in J&K on the night of 1st-2nd August 2000.

2. On August 1, at about 1845 hours, two terrorist armed with AK rifles appeared near the foot bridge in Lidder Nallah in Pahalgam and started firing indiscriminately on Yatris (pilgrims or the annual Amarnath pilgrimage) and shopkeepers. In the firing
by the terrorists resulting exchange of fire, 32 persons were killed, some on the spot (excluding 2 militants) of whom 20 were yatries (including 2 unidentified bodies), 10 were locals and 2 were police personnel. 42 persons sustained injuries (out of which
18 were locals).

3. In the second and third incidents, militants had attacked two brick kiln labour camps, one at Mir Bazar, Quazigund in Anantnag District the other at Mir Nowgam (Achhabal). 19 labourers were killed at Mir Bazar and 7 labourers at Mir Nowgam. During the
same night in Pogal Paristan in Ramban area (Doda District) another group of militants killed 14 persons. In the same district in village Keyar eight members of a village defence committee were killed by terrorists. The sixth incident took place at Kalaroos
(Kupwara district) where five members of a Muslim family were massacred.


Kothi Bagh Bomb blast in Srinagar on 10th Aug. 2000.

The Kothibagh bomb blast case opposite the State Bank of India in Srinagar on 10th Aug’2000 in which 15 persons including 12 police personnel and 1 photo journalist of the national daily, “The Hindustan Times” were killed and 23 were injured was also organized
by Lashkar-e-Toiba on instructions received from Pakistan to indulge in something spectacular. A joint team of SOG Srinagar and local police arrested 6 accused affiliated to Lashkar-e-Toiba who were involved in this blast case. The car No.JK01 D 9009 of J&K
bank had brought to the spot by Iqbal Khan @Abu Hurera, a foreign mercenary along with the Mir Hussain Cheechee @ Shabir @ Kaloo Khan and a female companion around 12 p.m. on and parked adjacent to SBI lane.

(e) Attack on Amarnath Yatris in 2001:

In an attempt to disrupt the Government’s endeavours at restoring peace and normalcy in J&K by perpetrating violence on innocent civilians, terrorist outfits struck in the wee hours of 21st July 2001 at Sheshnag Amarnath Yatri Camp, in Anantnag District.
A grenade blast took place at 1.30 a.m. near Yatri Camp at Sheshnag. Police personnel headed by Dy. SP, Shri Praveen Kumar rushed to the spot and after half an hour another grenade blast took place followed by firing by a militant from a tent near the Yatra
Camp. After the initial burst, the militant continued firing occasionally. The area was cordoned and segregated and at about 7 am one terrorist ran out of the tent firing indiscriminately. The intermittent firing by the terrorist resulted in the death of 6
pilgrims, 2 security personnel and 4 local civilians and injuries to 8 pilgrims, 5 security forces personnel and 2 local civilians. The security forces shot down the terrorist. The slain militant belongs to Lashkar-E-Toiba and 1 AK 56 rifle, 4 magazines and
some ammunition were recovered from this person. He also had some incriminating document.

2. Further 12 innocent civilians were also massacred in Kishtwar area Doda District in two separate incidences on 22nd July 2001.

(f) Attack on State Assembly in Srinagar on 1.10.2001.

In a major assault on the symbols of democracy, terrorists launched a fidayeen attack on the State Assembly in Srinagar killing 39 persons and injuring 60 others, by blewing up a car bomb. This includes 4 Pakistani terrorists associated with Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM) .

2. In the afternoon, after the day’s proceedings were over, one Tata Sumo, later on found hijacked one just half an hour before the incident, crashed into the bunker adjoining the main gate of the Assembly Complex.. Instantaneously an explosion was caused
resulting in spot death of several persons including security personnel and civilians and injuries to many others. Later on, 3 terrorists holed up inside the Assembly premises were killed in a fierce encounter with the security forces. The terrorist outfits,
JeM claimed the responsibility for the attack.

3. The identify of all the 4 terrorists killed has been identified as under:

i. Wajahat Hussain code Saifullah r/o Pakistan
ii. Mohd. Irfan Zaman code Omar r/o Karachi
iii. Abdul Raouf Ehsan r/o Shewal Punjab, Pakistan
iv. Tariq Ahmed code Ayobi r/o Sehwal Punjab, Pakistan.

4. The dastardly terrorist attack has sent shock waves throughout the State and people of all walk of life have condemned this cowardly act of terrorism in strongest words.

5. This emphasized the desperation of terrorist outfits and changing complexion of the terrorist violence by resorting to more and more such fidayeen attacks to ward off increasing pressure of Security Forces. Intense pressure on terrorist will continue
to built up to frustrate their nefarious designs.

6. Government has not sought the intervention of any country in solving the problem of cross border terrorism in J&K. However, Government has used every opportunity to apprise the International Community including the United States, of Pakistan’s support
to and sponsorship of cross border terrorism in India. Following the terrorist fidayeen attack on 1st October 2001 on J&K Assembly building in Srinagar, the Prime Minister had conveyed to the United States and other friendly countries, the sense of anguish
felt by the people of India at this terrorist attack.

7. On 12th October 2001, the United States placed Jaish-e-Mohammed the group that had claimed responsibility for this incident, on the list of terrorist organizations of the US Department of Treasury under the Presidential Executive order of 23rd September

(g) Attack on Parliament on 13 December 2001:

The shocking and ghastly attack against the Parliament House on 13th December 2001 was an assault on the very bastion of Indian democracy and was clearly aimed at wiping out the country’s top political leadership. It is only the alertness and the supreme sacrifice
of the security personnel on duty that averted what could have been a national catastrophe. The terrorist assault has shocked the entire nation. The terrorist act and its perpetrators deserve to be condemned in the strongest of terms.

2. The attack on the Parliament is undoubtedly the most audacious and the most alarming act of terrorism in the nearly two-decade long history of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in India. The Prime Minister in his Address to the Nation on 13th December declared
that the fight against terrorism had reached a decisive phase. The Prime Minister also stated that the Indian people are united and determined to stamp out terrorism from the country.

3. Investigations at this stage indicate that the five terrorists entered the Parliament House complex at about 1140 AM on 13th December in an Ambassador car bearing registration number DL-3CJ-1527 and moved towards building gate number 12 when it encountered
the carcade of Vice-President of India which was parked at Gate No. 11. A member of the Parliament House Watch and Ward Staff became suspicious about the identity of the car and immediately ran after it. The car was forced to turn backward and in the process
it hit the Vice-President’s car. When challenged by the security personnel present on the spot, all the five terrorists jumped out of the car and started firing indiscriminately. The Delhi Police personnel attached with the Vice-President’s security as also
other security personnel on duty immediately took positions and returned the fire. At this stage, an alarm was raised and all the gates in the building were closed. The terrorists ran towards Gate No. 12 and then to Gate No. 1 of the Parliament House building
where one terrorist was shot dead by the security forces and in the process the explosives wrapped around his body exploded. The remaining four terrorists turned back and reached Gate No. 9 of the building. Three of them were gunned down there. The fifth terrorist
ran towards Gate No. 5 where he too was gunned down.

4. Investigations led to the arrest of Syed Abdul Rehman Gilani, a lecturer in a local college whose interrogation led to the identification and subsequent arrest of two other accomplices, Afzal and Shaukat Hussain Guru.

5. Afzal, an important associate and support element in the conspiracy has confessed that all five militants were Pakistanis and has identified them. Significantly, nobody from India, including J&K, has claimed that the killed militants were related to them.
Further, on the eve of this suicidal action, some of these militants spoke on telephone to their relatives in Pakistan, particularly Karachi. There is substantial proof in this regard.

6. Afzal has also disclosed that the suicide attack on Parliament was directed by Shahbaz Khan alias Ghazi Baba, who is a known Pakistani national and presently the Chief Commander of JeM operating in Kashmir. He was also the mastermind behind the attack
on J&K Assembly on October 1, 2001. Afzal has also revealed that in the period before the attack, they maintained constant touch through e-mail with Ibrahim, located in Pakistan, who is a senior JeM functionary under Maulana Masood Azhar.

7. Afzal has disclosed that the five Pak militants had been advised by their Pak masters to communicate with them through third countries so that their Pak linkages remain unknown. There is substantial proof in this regard. Pak funding to the militants was
similarly routed via third countries.

8. Particularly significant is the fact that detonators seized from one of the hideouts of Pak militants are of Pak origin and the carton containing these detonators bore the name of Nobel Detonators (Pvt) Ltd., known to be an explosives manufacturing unit
located in Wah, District Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

9. Prof. A.R. Gilani arrested in connection with the conspiracy has revealed that LeT and JeM were responsible for the attack. Technical intelligence available with our agencies also spoke of the involvement of LeT, which was under directions of Pak ISI
to remain totally silent in this regard and to not even discuss amongst themselves.

10. Afzal has revealed that slain militant, Mohammad is identical with Sunny Ahmed Kazi alias Burger (a Pakistani) who was one of the hijackers of IC-814 from Kathmandu in December 1999. There is indeed a striking resemblance in the photographs of the two.
This would, however, require confirmation through biometric tests.

11. Investigations also indicated that the two groups, LeT and JeM, had also planned other attacks in Delhi and other parts of India. This incident has once again made it clear that the real epicenter of terrorism lies in Pakistan. Terrorist groups like
the LeT, JeM and others continue to operate with impunity from Pakistani soil.

12. Even after the ghastly terrorist attacks of 11 September, the leaders of LeT and other Pak-based terrorist groups continued to publicly issue threats against India. For example, in a discussion organized by Pakistani Urdu newspaper, ‘Ausaf’ on 20th November
2001, the Amir of LeT and its Chief ideologue, Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed vowed to revive the so-called struggle in Kashmir by ‘launching six to seven Red Fort-type attacks in India’. Such threats were also been put up recently on its website. Further, in an interview
with the ‘Gulf News’ on 21st November, he stated that LeT would device new strategies to overcome the pressure from the West. In mid-December, LeT also launched a fund raising campaign for their activities in J&K through appeals published in the Pakistani
Urdu press. Pak press reports also indicate that groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen,

Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Jamat-e-Islami and Sunni Tehrik openly raised funds before the Id prayers. As much as Rs. 100 million was reportedly collected in Karachi itself.

13. Foreign Secretary called in the Pak High Commissioner on 14th December 2001 and issued a verbal demarche informing him that we have reliable information based on technical intelligence that the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) were
involved in the terrorist attack on our Parliament and called upon Pakistan to take immediate action to arrest those associated with these organizations, seal their offices, stop their activities and block all their financing sources. She added that actions
against the LeT and JeM have already been taken in several countries, including US, UK and India.

14. In view of the complete lack of concern on the part of Pakistan and its continued promotion of cross-border terrorism, on 21st December 2001, Government announced its decision to recall the Indian High Commissioner from Islamabad, as also the decision
to terminate the services of the Samjhauta Express and the bus service between Delhi and Lahore w.e.f. 1st January 2002.

15. Regrettably, Pakistan failed to appreciate India’s serious concerns about the ramifications of the 13th December attack on our Parliament. It is doubly regrettable that attempts to dupe the international community with cosmetic half measures, non-measures
or even fictitious incidents have continued, which is unacceptable – terrorism needs to be eradicated fully, regardless of whatever name or ground is used to justify it.

16. Government of India, therefore, had no option but to take further steps including reduction of the staff of the respective High Commissions in the two countries by 50%, restriction on their movements within the municipal limits of Delhi, and cessation
or suspension of over flight facilities available to Pakistan or Pakistan International Airlines to fly over Indian airspace.

17. It appears that Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf had joined the international coalition against terrorism not out of choice but out of compulsion. Even as Pakistan professed cooperation with the international coalition, reports continued to come in
of men and material going across clandestinely to the Taliban. We were all witness to the efforts made by the Pakistani leaders to evacuate their nationals, including Army personnel from Kunduz.

18. Pakistan recently announced some cosmetic measurements such as seizure of assets of LeT and Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, both of which were recently cited by the US President as having links with the Al-Qaida terrorist network. Simultaneously, however, LeT announced
that the title of its parent organisation had been changed from Markaz Dawa-wal-Irshad to ‘Jamaat ud Dawah’. It also announced the formation of a new general council headed by Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri. Lashkar had already announced earlier that its office
was being moved to POK. As for accounts of LeT being frozen byPakistan, specific details have not been made public. In any case sufficient time was available for the money to be diverted from these accounts. Similarly, action taken against JeM so far is clearly
not enough. In any case, JeM has already renamed itself Tehriq ul Furqan and steps against JeM can thus not be anything more than a superficial action.

19. The above is an assessment that even Pakistani commentators themselves share. According to a well-known Pak columnist, in ‘The News’ dated 25th December 2001, “any determination of the military government to root out Jehadi outfits from Pakistan may
only have superficial success as almost all groups which were likely to be targeted .. have already changed
their names and have decentralised their operation into various secret underground cells”.

20. After the events of September 11, the focus of international attention in the struggle against terrorism had, for some time, concentrated on Afghanistan. Exigencies of action had made many ignore for a while that the problem itself could not really be
an effective part of the solution.

21. There is no doubt in anyone’s mind about the support that terrorism receives in Pakistan. There is only some confusion about whether or not there is now a change of heart. We have seen no evidence of any such change of heart.

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18987/Fact+Sheet+on+Jammu+amp+Kashmir

MEA Press Release: Home Minister takes serious view of reported incident of gang rape in J&K April 20, 2002

The Home Minister, Shri L.K. Advani has taken a serious view of the reported incident of gang rape in J&K. Existing instructions to the Central Para Military Forces are being reiterated to ensure that the security forces do not indulge in Human Rights violations
during their operations in J&K.

Government is also taking all steps to ensure that the complaint regarding three Jawans of BSF having raped a girl of Khullar Nad, Police Station Pehalgam in J&K on 18th April 2002 is enquired into thoroughly, fairly and in an expeditious manner. It has been
made clear that if found guilty of the heinous act, the concerned would not be spared and exemplary action would be taken against them. A case has been registered in Pehalgam Police Station. The Police enquiry is being conducted by a Dy. SP. The BSF unit concerned
immediately made available the whole contingent of their patrol for identification parade and the three accused persons having been taken into custody have been placed in close arrest. Simultaneously the BSF have started the process of Staff Court of Enquiry
and an SP level (Commandant BSF) officer from a unit other than that to which the accused belongs is conducting the enquiry.

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18988/Press+Release+Home+Minister+takes+serious+view+of+reported+incident+of+gang+rape+in+JampK+April+20+2002

MEA Observers for Elections in Jammu & Kashmir

Nirvachan Sadan, Ashoka Road, New Delhi-110001

No. ECI/PN/22/2002
June 13, 2002

Subject: Observers for Elections in Jammu & Kashmir

(Text of statement made by Chief Election Commissioner during his visit to Jammu & Kashmir from 16-18 June, 2002)

Our law on elections, unlike the election systems of some other countries, does not allow foreign observers. On the other hand, it enjoins the Election Commission to appoint its own observers who are senior civil servants. India has a large pool of neutral
civil servants.

As in elections in other parts of the country, in the coming Jammu and Kashmir elections, the Election Commission will rely on media reports including those in the foreign media. So the media, including foreign media, will have easy access to polling stations.

The Election Commission shall not invite any group, body or organization to function as observers for the J & K election. However, if any individual who is associated with the conduct of elections in his country and that country has good democratic credentials,
then in his individual capacity, he can come to see the election, subject, of course, to the person’s getting necessary governmental clearance.

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18980/Observers+for+Elections+in+Jammu+amp+Kashmir

MEA Steps being taken by the Election Commission to ensure free and fair elections in Jammu & Kashmir

Nirvachan Sadan, Ashoka Road, New Delhi-110001

No. ECI/PN/22/2002
June 13, 2002

Subject : Steps being taken by the Election Commission to ensure free and fair elections in Jammu & Kashmir.

  • With a view to ensuring that the next J&K Assembly elections shall be among the fairest in the history of the State, the Election Commission chose to interactively engage with all the players in the electoral process, viz., recognised political parties
    in J&K State, the local press and government officials, particularly, field functionaries who conduct elections, many months in advance. The main objectives were to have a sound system in place, to create an atmosphere for competitive elections and impart
    a sense of security to intending parties and candidates.
  • To this end, the Chief Election Commissioner, alongwith Election Commissioner, Shri B.B. Tandon, and accompanied by a team of Election Commission officials, had visited both Jammu and Srinagar and held detailed discussions with representatives of all recognised
    political parties in J&K State, members of the press and the concerned officials, including Deputy Commissioners of districts, in March, 2002. Thereafter, officials from the Commission have been making visits to the State every month to observe on ground that
    the directives of the Commission are actually being followed and implemented. The last important visit took place towards the end of May, when Election Commissioner, Shri T.S. Krishna Murthy, along with the concerned Secretary in the Election Commission dealing
    with the J&K State, went to Srinagar.
  • The first task that the Commission carried out in its March visit was to disabuse the people that just because they were visiting Kashmir, the elections were around the corner. All concerned were told in emphatic terms that the elections were a long way
    off and large number of management inputs were to be put in place before they would be held. They were also told that repeated visits to the State shall take place so that the Commission drives information on a first hand basis about the nature of implementation
    on ground of its directives. Finally, it was clearly spelled out that it is the Commission and Commission alone which shall decide on the dates and schedule of elections.
  • The inputs received from the political parties have been most helpful to the Commission in charting out its course of action to ensure a good election in the State. All the political parties had complained that the electoral rolls were inaccurate, containing
    within them large number of dead voters, that they were unwieldy as they contained a large number of supplementaries and that they were in large parts not legible due to repeated photocopies. The political parties also urged the Commission to issue identity
    cards to voters to prevent bogus voting. They wanted the existing polling station locations to be rationalised so that voters don’t have to travel over long distances. Finally, when they were informed that this time the elections would be conducted through
    Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), they welcomed it as EVMs totally rule out any abuse in the counting of votes.
  • Based on its interactions with different groups in J&K State, the Commission has so far taken measures in the following areas with a view to bringing about good election practices during polls in the J&K State. They are :-
    • Making available to all concerned in the State clean, legible, computerised electoral rolls of high accuracy, which would form the basis for the electorate to cast their franchise.
    • Moving electronic voting machines into the State to subserve the stated intention of the Commission to conduct the elections by using EVMs in all polling stations.
    • Issuing instructions to the concerned field functionaries in the State to rationalise the polling stations so that not more than three polling stations be housed in one building and by and large no voter is to traverse more than 2 kms. to reach his polling
      station. This exercise, which is to be carried out in consultation with political parties, is to be over by 25.06.2002.
    • Issuing directions to the law and order authorities to ensure that there is a measure of equity amongst recognised political parties in getting security cover so that their election campaign can take place on an equitable basis.
    • Issuance of photo identity cards to voters in State.
  • The points enumerated above show the efforts being made by the Commission in ensuring good and clean elections in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. However, some amount of elaboration is necessary on the two points of computerisation of electoral rolls and
    issuance of photo identity cards. Due to a variety of reasons, the primary one being unrest in the Valley, the electoral rolls of the State were last intensively revised in 1988. Thereafter, they have been revised, more or less every year, on a summary basis.
    Thus, over a period of 14 years, the rolls have generated a large number of supplements of inclusions, deletions and correction and have become unwieldy and lacking in accuracy. Moreover, the rolls have been hand-written and photo-copied from time to time
    whenever summary revisions took place or elections or bye-elections were held as a result of which a large mass of illegible paper reached both the polling stations and the political parties and formed the basis for the voting which took place. This was the
    common complaint made by all political parties when the Commission made the aforesaid visit to the State in March, 2002.
  • The Commission, therefore, launched the programme to bring about accuracy in the rolls by removing dead voters there from and including those who have been left out for any reason, with reference to 01.01.2002 as the qualifying date. This was carried out
    as a special drive during April to May, 2002, in which the entire electoral machinery in the State was actively involved right down to the polling station level. As urged by all political parties in rural areas, this exercise was carried out by comparing the
    rolls with the panchayat rolls. This has resulted in fairly clean rolls in the State comparable in its accuracy to other States. The computerisation of rolls in Jammu and Kashmir, which are in Urdu, was held up because of non-availability of proper fonts and
    the expertise in data entry in Urdu in large numbers. This problem was overcome by locating a software company that developed the programme by which the rolls in Urdu could be computerised, and by entrusting the work of data entry to the Uttar Pradesh Urdu
    Academy. The entire operation, some small portion of which is still underway, was launched in the last week of April with teams from all the 87 Assembly Constituencies in J&K State going over to Lucknow and Kanpur with their electoral rolls. Each roll with
    the mother roll of 1988 and supplements of all subsequent years upto 2002 has now been consolidated into one roll. The data entry in Urdu, being carried out at 15 centres, was corrected for errors once at the centre itself and thereafter taken back to the
    Districts for another check and brought back to Lucknow and Kanpur for further corrections. It is only after such intensive checks that computerised rolls are being finally printed which would be used for the elections.
    This massive exercise is almost over, with 90% of the work, i.e., data entry of about 52 lakh electors out of about 55 lakh total electorate being already finished. The Commission, through this release, wishes to place on record its deep appreciation of the
    field staff of all the Districts in J&K State, who have carried out this arduous work, and also to the UP Urdu Academy for carrying out this huge task without any slippages.
  • As regards the photo identity cards, because the current computerisation of J&K rolls does not have the full backup of 46 control tables as in the other States and the rolls in J&K State have been generated with 8 control tables, the conventional method
    of issuance of photo identity cards by using computers cannot be adopted in the State at this stage. Moreover, in view of the security implications of photo identity cards, it was felt that a higher order of security is necessary for photo identity cards in
    Jammu and Kashmir than in the rest of the country. The Commission has, therefore, entrusted to the India Security Press, Nashik, the task of preparing pre-formatted, pre-numbered photo identity cards on special security paper on which the elector’s photograph
    furnished by him would be affixed and the card laminated and issued to him/her. This is a measure to achieve Commission’s objectives to ensure compulsory identification of voters at the time of elections. Under this ambitious programme to be launched shortly,
    the cards would start to be issued to the voters in Jammu and Kashmir from 15th June onwards. Necessary precautions have been taken to ensure that it is only the genuine voter who gets the card. Also, the Commission will ensure through appropriate directions
    in time that no genuine voter is denied the right to cast his/her vote.
  • Lastly, the Commission wants to carry out a historic first in the election management for the elections in J&K State. The Commission, through its computerisation of rolls, would generate voters slips on household basis for the voters in J&K State and issue
    these slips to them at their door steps. This has been a long-standing demand of most of the political parties with the Commission as it considerably reduces their cost in campaign as well as ensures a fair and equitable outreach.


Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18978/Steps+being+taken+by+the+Election+Commission+to+ensure+free+and+fair+elections+in+Jammu+amp+Kashmir

MEA Steps being taken by the Election Commission to ensure free and fair elections in Jammu & Kashmir

Nirvachan Sadan, Ashoka Road, New Delhi-110001

No. ECI/PN/29/2002
July 12, 2002

Subject : Steps being taken by the Election Commission to ensure free and fair elections in Jammu & Kashmir.

  • During the recent visits of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners to the State, representatives of various political parties represented to the Commission that clubbing of the polling stations as done in 1996 has put the electors
    to inconvenience and requested that the polling may be held on the basis of the lists of polling stations approved earlier in 1988.
  • The Commission has considered this matter and decided that at the ensuing general election to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir the polling stations shall be dispersed and located as far as practicable, at the locations indicated in the electoral
    roll of 1988, subject to the changes approved by the Commission. This will involve opening up of more than nine hundred additional locations where voters can cast their votes. Efforts will be made to ensure that, as far as practicable, voters are not required
    to travel more than 2 kms. to reach their polling stations, and not more than 3 polling stations are located in one building.
  • During the general election to the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly held in 1996 and the general elections to the House of the People held in 1998 and 1999, the Kashmiri Pandits who migrated to various parts of the country from Kashmir Valley were
    notified as notified class of voters and were allowed to vote by post. The Commission has received complaints that there was considerable delay in the transmission of these postal ballot papers to the Returning Officers and, as a result, a significant percentage
    of the notified class of voters was deprived of their voting rights. To obviate these difficulties and to make the voting right of these Kashmiri migrants more effective, the Commission has, after considering the matter, decided to extend the facility of voting
    in person through Electronic Voting Machines, to this class of notified voters in their own camps at Jammu and Delhi, where they are now living. In the case of other notified voters, living elsewhere, they will have the option to vote by post as earlier.
  • Further, with a view to ensuring free and fair election in Jammu and Kashmir, the electoral rolls of all the 87 assembly constituencies in the State have been computerised in Urdu and copies of the same are being distributed, free of cost, to all recognised
    political parties in the State. During the visits of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners to the State, there have been requests from some registered unrecognised political parties that they should also be supplied copies of the
    electoral rolls free of cost.
    Normally electoral rolls are given free of cost only to recognised political parties. The Commission has, after taking into consideration these requests and other factors, decided as a special case and as a one time measure, that all these registered unrecognised
    political parties in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, who have legislative presence, i.e., who have even one representative in the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, shall be supplied with one copy each of the electoral rolls, free of cost. This would
    mean that three political parties, PDP, J & K Awami League and J&K National Panther’s Party shall get this benefit.
  • During the recent visit of the Commission to the State, a common grievance made by several political parties was that whereas the leaders of the ruling party in the State were holding ministerial or other important offices in the State executive and were
    therefore provided with heavy security which enabled them to move around in the State and undertake electoral campaigns for their party, the leaders of other political parties in opposition were not enjoying any such privileges and they were feeling severely
    handicapped in their free movement within the State. The Commission considered this genuine grievance of the political parties and held a meeting with the Union Home Secretary wherein its was agreed that the leaders of the other political parties should also
    be provided with reasonable security cover so that they are also able to take up their election campaigns.
  • On the request of the Commission, the Union Government has now directed the State Government to provide security cover, at the State cost, to one leader of each recognised National and State Party in the State of Jammu and Kashmir in each of the Districts
    in the valley and in the Districts of Doda, Rajouri, Poonch and Jammu. The recognised parties in the opposition, who are benefited by this order of the Commission are: Bahujan Samaj Party, Bharatiya Janata Party, Communist Party of India, Communist Party of
    India (Marxits), Indian National Congress, and Nationalist Congress Party.
  • The Commission has also announced that it would send its own Observers who are senior civil servants to oversee the election process in the State. In the first phase, twenty hand-picked senior civil servants known capabilities, proven track record and dynamism
    are being deputed to the State from the coming week. Each district will have one Observer and some larger districts will have two Observers.


Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18986/Steps+being+taken+by+the+Election+Commission+to+ensure+free+and+fair+elections+in+Jammu+amp+Kashmir

MEA Schedule for the General Elections to the Legislative Assembly

Election Commission of India
Schedule for the General Elections to the Legislative Assembly

1 Announcement of elections 2nd August, 2002 (Friday)
Stages Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV
2 Notification 22nd August, 2002
29th August, 2002
6th Sept., 2002
13th Sept., 2002
3 Last Date for filing nominations 29th August, 2002
5th Sept., 2002
13th Sept., 2002
20th Sept., 2002
4 Scrutiny of nominations 31st August, 2002
6th Sept., 2002
14th Sept., 2002
21st Sept., 2002
5 Withdrawal of candidatures 2nd Sept., 2002
9th Sept., 2002
16th Sept., 2002
23rd Sept., 2002
6 Dates of Poll 16th Sept., 2002
24th Sept., 2002
1st Oct., 2002
8th Oct., 2002
7 Counting of votes on
10th Oct., 2002 (Thursday)
8 Date before which the election 12th Oct., 2002 (Saturday)
shall be completed

Source: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18972/Schedule+for+the+General+Elections+to+the+Legislative+Assembly